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The Effects of Maternal Welfare Receipt on
Children’s Development
Nikolay Doskov

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 25 years, welfare and other public policies for families
living below the poverty line have developed a primary objective of promoting
parents’ self-sufficiency. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), passed in 1996, was a milestone in this effort,
limiting the number of years that families can receive federal cash welfare assistance and requiring most of them to participate in work-related activities
to be eligible for such assistance. This new emphasis on work was one of the
main reasons for the dramatic decline in welfare dependency during the late
1990s. The new legislation, however, also prompted an extensive debate over
the effects of welfare reform on the cognitive development and well-being of
children.
Proponents of welfare reform argue that parental employment (and
limited welfare assistance) benefits children by providing them with good family role models who work and are self-sufficient. Others, however, posit that
the stresses of work cause parents to spend less time with their children and
neglect children’s developmental needs, particularly in single-parent households. Public financial transfers also ease the economic hardship of poverty
and hence may improve the material and emotional environment at home, and
the child’s developmental outcomes. At the same time, however, welfare participation may also increase parents’ and children’s anxiety over being isolated
or stigmatized and thus affect parent-child interaction, and impair children’s
emotional functioning. As contending theories yield ambiguous predictions,
quantifying the net effect of maternal welfare receipt on children’s attainments
is an important research question.
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This paper examines the relationship between public assistance
(AFDC/TANF) and school-age children’s developmental outcomes. I investigate the effects of single mothers’ decisions to participate in welfare assistance
programs on their children’s Math, Reading, and Behavioral test scores at different points of time. I estimate models similar to those found in the literature using a new type of sample and employing several alternative econometric
techniques. The objective of this exercise is to test for evidence of a causal
relationship between welfare receipt and children’s outcomes.
Previous research on the effects of welfare receipt on child well-being
has shown that children living in welfare households have significantly poorer cognitive and behavioral outcomes than do children living in non-welfare
households. While studies using unconditional correlations and simple linear
regressions consistently find that welfare receipt is associated negatively with
children’s outcomes, the causal relationship between child outcomes and public assistance is unclear for at least two reasons. First, all children who live in
welfare households are poor and thus the negative relationship between welfare and children’s outcomes may simply reflect the well-documented negative
relationship between poverty and child well-being (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn,
1997). Second, despite AFDC’s entitlement nature, the participation rate in
the program is less than 100 percent. This implies that eligible mothers who
choose to receive benefits may possess certain characteristics that predispose
them to opt into welfare but that also affect children’s well-being and development. For example, if the mother’s decision to enter the welfare system is
based on unobservable characteristics such as self-esteem and welfare stigma
perceptions, which may also correlate with children’s outcomes, the estimates
based simply upon a comparison between AFDC participants and non-participants would be biased. Much of the literature on the short- and long-term
effects of maternal welfare receipt on children has failed to control adequately
for the endogeneity of welfare receipt and poverty and for the selection of eligible families into welfare. This may lead to bias in the estimation of the effects
of central interest.
In this paper, I examine the question of welfare’s effects from the other
side of the mirror, focusing on children born only to mothers who are both categorically and income eligible to receive welfare assistance. Since all children
raised in households eligible to receive welfare benefits have experienced poverty, restricting comparisons to those children is a way to control for the effects
6

of poverty on outcomes. In order to address potential problems associated
with unobserved heterogeneity in the sample, I follow Levine and Zimmerman
(2005) and implement (1) an instrumental variables (IV) estimator, which uses
welfare benefits and local labor market conditions as identifying instruments;
(2) family fixed-effect models that estimate differences in outcomes of children
living in the same households who may have differed in their welfare experience; and (3) individual fixed-effect models that measure the impact of changes
in the welfare status of the mother over time on changes in the outcomes of
individual children. These econometric techniques offer alternative ways of
controlling for the effects of unobservable maternal characteristics on child
outcomes and allow me to determine how sensitive the welfare effect is to alternative specifications.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly summarizes theory and relevant literature on the effects of public assistance on child
development. The third and fourth sections explain the modeling method, the
sample drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and
the variables included in the analysis. Section V explains the criteria I use to
classify mothers as eligible for AFDC/TANF. Results from the descriptive and
multivariate analyses are presented in the sixth and seventh sections. Discussion and conclusions follow.
II. THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Researchers have identified a number of economic, sociological, and
psychological pathways that link maternal welfare receipt and children’s developmental outcomes. First, welfare receipt may positively affect children’s wellbeing through a change in family economic resources. Welfare receipt alleviates financial pressure, helps smooth transitory fluctuations in family income
(Gruber, 2000), and allows parents to spend more time with their children.
Becker (1981) emphasizes the positive link between greater parental monetary
resources and greater investment in children’s human capital. According to
Becker’s human capital theory, parents allocate monetary resources between
current consumption and investments in children’s human capital (e.g. schooling) considering both benefits and costs. Presumably, poor families have little
time, money, or energy to devote to developing their children’s human capital
and earnings potential. As additional economic resources from welfare reduce
7

parents’ direct cost of human capital investment, children living in disadvantaged households may benefit from maternal welfare receipt.
Second, welfare receipt may change cultural and psychological traits
of parents and children. The welfare culture hypothesis posits that welfare
adversely affects children’s preferences for work and economic independence
by providing a negative role model, which lowers children’s educational effort
(Mead, 1992). Murray (1984) argues that the welfare system undermines the
moral character of poor people by rewarding idleness and family breakups and
thus changing conceptions of desirable behavior. To him, welfare is a problem
mainly because it removes the pressure to work among recipients.
Third, welfare-stigma perspectives emphasize the detrimental effect
of welfare on a recipient’s self esteem (Rainwater, 1982). Welfare recipients
lose self-esteem and become isolated since society defines them as deviant. It
is also possible that welfare stigma may have direct social and psychological
effects on children. For example, several studies have suggested that welfare
children are often stigmatized by their fellow students (Rainwater, 1982; Scott,
et al. 1999).
There are a number of empirical studies that provide estimates of
maternal welfare receipt on children’s well-being. Overall, they find a strong
negative raw correlation between maternal welfare and children’s outcomes.
However, introducing statistical controls for observable and unobservable differences between mothers often reduces and at times completely eliminates
this differential.
Currie and Cole (1993) examine the relationship between a mother’s
participation in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) during
pregnancy and the birth weight of her child. Using data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NSLY), they estimate OLS, IV and fixed effect
models in which they regress birth weight on participation in AFDC and other
relevant variables that might affect birth weight. Their OLS results suggest
that participation in AFDC is associated with undesirable maternal behavior
during pregnancy, such as smoking, drinking and delaying prenatal care, and
lower birth weight. However, the association between participation in AFDC
and poor pregnancy outcomes disappears when omitted maternal characteristics are controlled for using either instrumental-variables techniques or models with mother fixed effects.
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Driscoll and Moore (1997) examine the impact of maternal welfare
receipt on children’s developmental outcomes as measured by the Peabody Individual Achievement Tests (PIATs) and the Behavior Problems Index. Using
NLSY data, they estimate the raw correlation between welfare receipt and children’s outcomes controlling for various observable socio-demographic factors,
including a measure of poverty, and a two-stage selection model to address the
issue of selection of children’s mothers into welfare. The results suggest that
there exists a negative association between welfare receipt and outcomes for
both white and black children. However, this paper, as well as Currie and Cole
(1993), faces a potential form of bias related to sample selection. As Levine
and Zimmerman (2005) suggest, this paper was written several years ago, and
the respondents in the survey had become mothers at a relatively early age.
Young mothers are likely to have fewer advantages than the average mother in
the US population, both in income and experience, which may have biased the
results.
In the most recent paper on the effects of welfare receipt on children,
Levine and Zimmerman (2005) confirm the existence of a negative raw correlation between maternal welfare receipt and children’s outcomes. Children
aged 3 to 15 who grow up in households headed by females are found to score
lower on tests of cognitive development as measured by the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT), the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, and the Behavior Problems Index. The authors implement three alternative econometric
techniques – instrumental variables, sibling differences and child fixed effects
models – to identify whether this raw correlation is due to the mothers’ welfare
receipt or to some other, unobservable characteristics of mothers who receive
welfare. Results from the vast majority of models suggest that maternal welfare
receipt has little or no detrimental effect on children’s subsequent development. Although this paper is the most recent one on the topic and it controls
for a large number of covariates, it does not address the possible endogeneity
of welfare receipt and poverty. I address this potentially confounding factor by
introducing controls for welfare eligibility and focusing on the effects of welfare receipt on children who have all experienced poverty.
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III. METHODOLOGY
Following Levine and Zimmerman (2005), I estimate several reducedform models that relate the children’s cognitive and behavioral outcomes to
their welfare experience. The child outcomes are specified as a function of
the mother’s welfare decisions during the entire child’s life, the mother’s background and the child’s own demographic variables. Thus,

COi = a + bWi + dCC i + j PC i + n i , (1)
where COi is a developmental outcome of child i, born to a mother eligible to
receive welfare assistance in at least one month during the child’s life; Wi is the
percentage of time a mother spent on welfare since child i’s birth; CCi is a vector of child characteristics such as gender, race, and birth order; PCi is a vector
of parental characteristics such as mother’s age, education, marital status, and
others; and n i is an error term.
I estimate equation (1) using both OLS and instrumental variables.
The use of instrumental variables is a standard way of dealing with unobserved
heterogeneity in a non-experimental data set. As in past research, I adopt
AFDC/TANF benefit rule parameters over the period of my sample (19782002) along with local labor market conditions as instruments, assuming that
they correlate with the mother’s welfare decisions but are exogenous to any
unobserved maternal characteristics. Since I do not have data on the state
of residence of each child (and mother) in the sample, I estimate each model
using (1) the benefit rule parameters of the least welfare-generous state (Alabama); and (2) the benefit rule parameters of the most generous one (Alaska).
In particular, I use the maximum AFDC/TANF benefit applicable to a family
of size s at time t as the instrumental variable, along with the local unemployment rate, that predicts maternal welfare receipt ( Wi ). While my instruments
cannot capture any variations in the benefit level across states, they are able to
capture exogenous variations in benefits across families of differing size and
over time.
The second method I employ to control for the effects of unobservables in equation (1) involves the estimation of family fixed-effects models.
This method models the unobserved heterogeneity as a variable that is unique
to each child’s family of birth and eliminates it by estimating how differences
in welfare receipt within families over time affect differences in the outcomes
of siblings. Presumably, siblings living in the same household are likely to be
10

more similar than randomly selected groups of individuals on a variety of unobserved domains because, for example, they grow up in the same family environment, often attend the same schools, and face similar local labor market
conditions. At the same time, however, siblings may also differ in their welfare
experience. For instance, a mother may decide to enter the welfare system only
after her second child is born. Hence variations in the outcomes of siblings
living in the same household regressed on within-family variations in welfare
receipt over time may eliminate any unobserved family-specific characteristics
that likely plague OLS estimates of b in equation (1).
The biggest advantage of family-fixed effect models is that the fixed
effect of family-specific characteristics, including those that cannot typically
be observed, is eliminated. Variables that do not differ across siblings, such as
race, grandparent characteristics and family background are dropped because
the effects of such variables cannot be estimated. A potential drawback of this
approach, however, is that if certain unobserved family characteristics, such as
maternal health or ‘welfare stigma’ vary over time, and thereby affect siblings
differently, the family fixed-effect model will not be able to fully control for
unobservable heterogeneity.
Additionally, it is possible that some unobserved individual-specific
characteristics may be correlated with both maternal welfare receipt and children’s developmental outcomes. For example, imagine a child that suffers from
a deteriorating mental illness. The child’s condition may induce the mother to
reduce her labor supply and opt into welfare, but it will also be correlated with
the child’s cognitive outcomes. In this case, OLS or family fixed-effect models
will likely overstate the true welfare effect. To account for such unobserved
individual-specific characteristics, I estimate individual fixed-effect models
that presume the individual child possesses some unobserved fixed attributes
that affect developmental outcomes. In essence, individual fixed-effect models
measure the effects of variations in maternal welfare receipt over time on within-child variations in test scores and thus eliminate the confounding effects of
unobservable child characteristics on outcomes. Estimation of these models is
made possible by the longitudinal nature of my data set and the fact that many
children have been assessed more than once.
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IV. Determining THE WELFARE ELIGIBILITY OF MOTHERS
Previous studies have not distinguished between children who were
living in households eligible to receive welfare benefits and those who were
not. Some of the negative correlation found between mothers’ welfare experience and children’s outcomes may, therefore, reflect the negative relationship
between poverty and child well-being. Living in a low-income family has been
shown to be associated negatively with a number of child outcomes including
cognitive abilities, academic achievement, and to a lesser extent with mental
health and behavior (Duncan et al., 1997). Given that most children who live
in welfare households also live below the federal poverty line, any correlations
between welfare and child outcomes must consider the effects of poverty on
children.
As mentioned earlier, I control for the effects of poverty on outcomes
by restricting my sample to children living in households that are eligible to
receive welfare assistance. In particular, I distinguish between children born to
mothers who did not participate in AFDC/TANF because they were ineligible
and those who were eligible but chose not to participate. I control explicitly for
the mother’s eligibility both in the descriptive and multivariate analyses.
I determine the welfare eligibility of mothers based on a two-part test.
As mandated by law, program eligibility depends first upon being the single
parent of a minor child.1 Two-parent households and households without a
child under 18 are considered categorically ineligible to receive welfare benefits and are thus excluded from my sample. Second, non-participants who
are categorically eligible must also be income-eligible in order to be eligible for
AFDC. By law, a family is income-eligible for welfare assistance if the family’s
gross income does not exceed the family-specific break-even income, which
in turn is calculated based on the need and payment standards applicable to
the family. The formulas used to determine break-even incomes vary across
states, across families of different size, and over time. Let Pijt and Nijt denote
the payment and need standards for a family of size i in state j in year t. Taking
into account the significant changes that occurred in the welfare system over

1

This is true only in states that do not offer AFDC-UP (Unemployed Parent) benefits. Since I do not have data on the state
of residence of mothers, I assume that all respondents had lived in non-AFDC-UP states and restrict my sample to single-mom 		
households.
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the period of my sample, I calculate the family-specific break-even monthly
income as follows:
For t < 1985 , Bijt = 1.5 Pijt + 75 + 160 ⋅ (# _ of _ dependent _ children) ,
For 1985 ≤ t < 1989 , Bijt = 1.85 Pijt + 75 + 160 ⋅ (# _ of _ dependent _ children) ,
For t < 1985 , Bijt = 1.85Pijt + 90 + 1.5∙[175·(#_of_dependent_children_aged_2_or_older)
+ 200∙(#_of_dependent_children_under_age_2)],
and assume that a family is income eligible for AFDC if gross family income
(GIijt) satisfies the following conditions2:
For t < 1985 , GI ijt < Bijt ;
For 1985 ≤ t < 1989 , GI ijt < Bijt and GI ijt < 1.5 N ijt ;
For t < 1985 , GI ijt < Bijt and GI ijt < 1.85 N ijt ;
As mentioned earlier, a serious disadvantage of my data set is that it
does not provide information on the exact state of residence of each respondent in the survey. Because j is unknown, I cannot adjust for differences in
eligibility rules across states. To circumvent this problem, I conduct two distinct income-eligibility tests using (1) the program rules of the least generous
US state (j = Alabama) and (2) the program rules of the most generous one (j =
Alaska). In essence, this procedure identifies all children born to mothers who
would have been income-eligible for welfare assistance had they all lived in
Alabama or Alaska between 1978 and 2002. Because all program parameters
of the remaining 48 states, including need standards, payment standards and
AFDC/TANF benefits, are within the range defined by those of Alabama and
Alaska, this counterfactual approach allows me to obtain a lower bound (‘Alabama’ sub-sample) and an upper bound (‘Alaska’ sub-sample) on the true number of income-eligible families in the original NLSY sample. I use both samples
to estimate equation (1) and interpret the results as bounds of the estimated
welfare effect rather than as exact point estimates.

2

In addition to an income test, AFDC/TANF recipients are also required to pass an asset test. Program rules do not allow 		
AFDC recipients to own assets (excluding their home and one automobile) worth more than $1000. Because NLSY does not 		
provide asset information prior to 1985, I cannot adjust for this eligibility screen.
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V. DATA AND VARIABLES
Data. The data for this paper come from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY). This data source includes a nationally representative
sample of 12,686 men and women who were all 14 to 21 years of age on
December 31, 1978. Annual interviews have been completed with most of
these respondents since 1979, with a shift to a biennial interview mode after
1994. NLSY79 respondents provided extensive information on welfare receipt,
labor market participation, income, education, and family background. In
1986, data collection was expanded to include a Child Supplement (NLSY-CS)
that tracks the children of the women in the original sample. In every other
year from 1986 to 2002, the level of development of each child aged 5 to 15 was
assessed through a variety of tests such as the Peabody Individual Achievement
Test (PIAT), the Behavior Problems Index (BPI), the Home Observation for the
Measurement of the Environment (HOME) Inventory and others. Many children had been assessed more than once, and a large number of children had
siblings who were also assessed. As of 2002, the NLSY contains approximately
25,000 assessment scores of most of the 11,340 children born to the original
6,283 NLSY female respondents.
This analysis utilizes information on children’s Math, Reading, and
Behavioral test scores from the 1986-2002 waves of NLSY-CS. All children
aged 5 to 15 who were ever assessed in those years are used in the analysis, and
multiple observations on a given child are used when available. Information
about children’s characteristics such as race, age, gender, and birth order is
taken from the NLSY-CS, whereas information about maternal characteristics
such education, marital status, and household composition comes from the
mother-based NLSY. Each child’s welfare experience is derived from his or her
mother’s monthly welfare event history as reported in the main NLSY file.
The data employed in this paper extend the important advantage in
Levine and Zimmerman (2005) over the data employed in earlier analyses.
Most women with children in those studies had become mothers at a relatively
early age and thus may not be representative of all mothers. As of 2002, however, the women in the NLSY were between the ages of 37 and 44 and their
children represented approximately 90 percent of all children ever to be born
to this cohort of women. Though not randomly selected, these children are
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more likely to be representative of all children in the US population than were
the children included in previous analyses.
Data on AFDC/TANF program rules come from the Urban Institute’s
Transfer Income Model, version 3 (TRIM3). TRIM3 is a comprehensive microsimulation model that simulates the major governmental tax, transfer, and
health programs in the United States. For the purpose of this study, I use
TRIM3’s extensive documentation library as a source of information on state
and family-size specific payment standards, need standards, and AFDC/TANF
benefit rules from 1978 to 2002.3
Dependent Variables. Children’s developmental outcomes were measured in two ways: (1) mathematics and reading achievement on the Peabody
Individual Achievement Test (PIAT), and (2) the Behavior Problems Index
(BPI). The PIAT is a wide-range measure of academic achievement for children aged five and over and is widely used in research. The reading comprehension assessment measures the child’s ability to identify the meaning of what
s/he reads. The reading recognition assessment measures the child’s ability to
match letters, name names, and read words aloud, increasing in difficulty from
preschool to high school levels. The mathematics assessment includes items
that increase in difficulty from simple recognition of numerals to more advanced topics such as geometry and trigonometry. The PIAT math and reading assessments are administered directly to the children by specially trained
interviewers and are age standardized. The BPI is an index of 28 parent-report items concerning children’s behavior including antisocial behavior, distractable-hyperactive behavior, anxiousness/depression, headstrongness, immaturity, and peer conflict/social withdrawal. The index is scored such that a
higher score indicates more behavior problems. Both the PIATs and the BPI
measures enter the regression equations as age specific percentile scores.
Independent Variables. The central independent variable is a measure
of maternal welfare receipt, and it is given by the percentage of time a mother
spent on welfare since childbirth. This variable is aimed at capturing the extent of children’s welfare experience, not at capturing any variation in welfare
benefits over time. In addition to welfare receipt, most of the models I estimate include a core set of regressors that are intended to measure the mother’s
preferences, productivity, and child endowments. They include indicators for
3

Responsibility for any errors in eligibility determination remains with me. I am grateful to the staff of the Urban Institute for
generously providing public access to their data.
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the mother’s race, location of her birth, education of her parents, household
structure of the family when she was fourteen, her child’s age, sex, and birth
order. (Definitions and descriptive statistics are given in the Appendix). These
core regressors are not likely to be determined by choices made by the mother,
and are therefore suitable for inclusion in reduced-form equations. I exclude
the mother’s age at the time of the child assessment date from the core set of
regressors because this is determined by the age at which the child was born,
which is potentially a choice variable. The presence and characteristics of the
child’s father are also likely to be choice variables and are therefore excluded
from the set of core regressors. The same is true for the mother’s education
and the demographic structure of the household.
Most previous studies of the determinants of child development have
included many additional variables that are potentially jointly chosen by the
mother. For example, variables such as mother’s age, education, and number of children are likely to be influenced by the mother’s welfare decisions
and hence their inclusion in the model may confound estimates of the welfare
effect. However, as Levine and Zimmerman (2005) have pointed out, such
variables are likely to be strong determinants of child development and their
omission may lead to the opposite omitted variable bias. For instance, if children’s outcomes are directly affected by the level of education completed by
the mother, and the mother is discouraged to complete school due to the availability of welfare assistance, the child outcomes would appear to be related
to welfare receipt even if in reality the two are completely unrelated. As this
omitted variable bias could be rather large in absolute value, I estimate models
that include a set of additional (and possibly endogenous) variables such as
the percent of years mother was married since childbirth, mother’s age and
education, the number of children ever born to the mother and the mother’s
score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT score is the
sum of scores from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)
on arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and numerical operations. AFQT score and years of education are both intended to
measure the human capital possessed by the child’s mother.
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V. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
In this section, I examine briefly the degree of correlation in the raw
data between maternal welfare receipt and children’s developmental outcomes.
The top panel of Table 1 reports the mean percentile PIAT and BPI scores
of children differentiated by their mothers’ welfare-eligibility and actual receipt histories. As the table suggests, children whose mothers had been eligible for AFDC/TANF since childbirth had on average worse outcomes than
did children of never eligible mothers. Across all outcome measures, mean
test scores of children deteriorate along with the share of the child’s life spent
in welfare-eligible households. More importantly, children who experienced
welfare receipt had on average poorer outcomes than did eligible non-recipient
children. At the bivariate level, welfare receipt is associated with lower scores
on the PIAT Math and Reading tests and higher (worse) scores on the BPI. In
addition, those who experienced long-term receipt did generally worse than
shorter-term recipients. For example, children who experienced welfare 75 to
100 percent of their lives scored on average almost 17 percentile points lower
on the PIAT Math test than did children living in AFDC eligible non-recipient
households, and more than 30 percentile lower than did children from never
eligible households. Children living in welfare households also have more behavior problems than children from non-welfare households, although average
BPI scores do not seem to vary greatly along with the percentage of child’s life
that his or her mother received welfare assistance.
As Levine and Zimermann (2005) have previously shown, a large
portion of the bivariate negative raw correlation between welfare receipt and
children’s test scores presented above may be attributed to differences in observable characteristics of mothers from welfare and non-welfare households,
and not to welfare receipt itself. The lower portion of Table 1 emphasizes this
point by listing a number of family characteristics classified by the mothers’
welfare eligibility and welfare receipt histories. Table 1 indicates for example
that welfare mothers had on average less educated parents than non-welfare
mothers and almost half of them were raised in single-parent households.

17
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The average AFQT scores and the average years of education among welfare
mothers were lower than the average AFQT scores and years of education of
non-welfare mothers. In addition, mothers who received welfare benefits 75 to
100 percent of the time since childbirth had significantly lower average family
income in 2002 dollars ($17,088) relative to both eligible non-recipient mothers ($40,973) and never eligible mothers ($70,805). As suggested by these figures, children living in welfare households grow up in severely disadvantaged
households relative to their peers from non-welfare households. It is hardly
surprising that these children do worse on standardized tests than other more
advantaged children. The next section attempts to identify the extent to which
the negative raw correlation between welfare and children’s outcomes is due to
the various family characteristics listed in Table 1.
VII. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
In this section, I present the regression results from OLS, IV, family
fixed-effects, and child fixed-effects versions of equation (1). I estimate each
model separately for the sample of children whose mothers were eligible for
AFDC/TANF under Alabama’s eligibility rules (Income Test: Alabama) and for
those whose mothers were eligible under Alaska’s eligibility rules (Income Test:
Alaska). Overall, results are not sensitive to the particular eligibility test used.
Table 2 presents the effects of welfare receipt on child developmental
outcomes from three alternative specifications of equation (1), all estimated by
OLS. Although the OLS method ignores the potential endogeneity of maternal
welfare receipt, it offers the advantage of being robust to many specification
errors. OLS results from models that do not include any control variables are
displayed in the first column of Table 2. These results confirm the significant
negative correlation between welfare receipt and child outcomes found in the
descriptive analysis. At the bivariate level, a child who spent an additional 1
percent of his or her life in a welfare household scored on average about 0.17
percentile points lower on the three components of PIAT and 0.08 percentile
points higher on the BPI than did a child living in an eligible non-recipient
household.
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The second and third columns in Table 2 present the coefficients of maternal
welfare receipt for OLS models that include the set of core regressors (child’s
race, age, age squared and birth order; mother’s place of birth, living arrangements at age 14 and her parents’ education), and models that include a set of
additional (and possibly endogenous) regressors such as the mother’s marital
status, AFQT score and education. To the extent that these additional variables are affected by the mother’s welfare decisions, they may capture a portion
of the true intergenerational welfare effect. The coefficients on these control
variables are listed in Appendix Table A-3.
As suggested by the results in Tables 2 and A-3, factors, such as children’s race, age, birth order, and the mother’s level of human capital account
for a large portion of the bivariate differences in the PIAT scores of children,
but have little effect on the children’s BPI scores. In the PIAT models, controlling for measured socioeconomic factors sizably reduces the negative raw
correlation between maternal welfare receipt and children’s outcomes. For
example, the raw differential on the PIAT-Reading Recognition test between
a child whose mother received AFDC during 1 percent of his or her life and a
child whose mother never received any AFDC income despite being eligible for
benefits is 0.17 percentile points. After controlling for exogeneous maternal
and child characteristics, the differential falls to 0.14 percentile points. And
when all observable characteristics are controlled for, the differential drops to
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less than 0.07. In contrast, the addition of exogeneous covariates in the BPI
models increases the welfare effect for children by about 0.02 percentile points,
whereas the addition of the full set of regressors does not have a sizable impact.
In both the PIAT and BPI models, however, welfare receipt continues to be
negatively correlated with poor developmental outcomes for children. These
OLS findings strongly support previous literature that indicates that maternal
welfare receipt is associated with adverse outcomes among children.
Consistent with previous studies, control variables such as child’s
race and age; maternal AFQT score and years of education are found to be
significant predictors of child development. For example, an additional year
of maternal education is significantly associated with almost a 0.3 percentile
point increase in children’s PIAT-Math scores and with a 0.17 percentile point
decrease in children’s BPI scores. Similarly, a one percent increase in mother’s
AFQT score is significantly associated with a 0.3 percentile point increase in
children’s PIAT-reading scores. Firstborn children generally achieve greater
scores than others. Finally, girls have significantly lower BPI scores than boys,
and child’s age is positively related to behavior problems.
To account for the potential endogeneity of the welfare receipt measure, the models are estimated using an instrumental variables (IV) approach.
The additional instruments used to predict the welfare experience of children
are the maximum AFDC/TANF benefit rules in Alabama (Table 3, part A) or
Alaska (Table 3, part B), and the local unemployment rate in the years since
the child was born. Table 3 presents the regression results from models that
include the set of core regressors and IV models that include the full set of
regressors.
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Compared with the OLS estimates, results from this approach show stronger
negative effects of welfare receipt on children’s outcomes when controlling for
exogenous parental characteristics. For instance, the IV results suggest that
a percentage increase in the welfare experience of a child living in a welfareeligible household is associated with a 0.29 percentile point decrease in the
child’s PIAT-Math score, while the OLS results point to a much lower negative
welfare effect of 0.17. The addition of the set of additional regressors in the IV
models, however, reduces significantly the negative correlation between welfare receipt and child outcomes across all outcome measures, and the majority
of estimates become insignificant. These mixed results seem to suggest that a
large portion of the negative welfare effect may be due to unobservable family
characteristics that are not accounted for in the OLS models.
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Tables 4 and 5, which present the estimates based on family and individual
fixed-effects models, provide stronger evidence for this conclusion. As seen in
Table 4, estimates based on family fixed effects models across all specifications
are predominantly positive and insignificant. The only two statistically significant relationships that I find in these models indicate that maternal welfare
receipt is associated at the bivariate level with higher children’s PIAT Reading
scores. As in the IV models, the addition of the set of core and additional regressors generally reduces this positive effect and all results become insignificant. Overall, family fixed-effects models do not suggest any significant associations between maternal welfare receipt and poor developmental outcomes
for children.
Like the family fixed effects model, models with child fixed effects do
not suggest any negative causal impacts of welfare receipt on children. As seen
in Table 5, estimates based on child fixed effects models are all positive and
mostly significant. These results suggest that PIAT-Math and BPI scores of
children living in households that are eligible for welfare assistance may actually improve with welfare experience. For example, welfare receipt has a
negative, statistically significant effect on children’s behavior problems with
or without controlling for observable family characteristics. The magnitude of
this impact, however, is small: for a 10 percent increase in time on welfare, the
average of the within-child variation in behavior problems drops by 0.7 percentile points. Both in the BPI and PIAT models, the introduction of controls
for heterogeneity associated with unobserved child characteristics eliminates
completely the negative association between welfare receipt and child development. Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 provide little evidence of any causal
impact of welfare receipt on children.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I estimated the effect of maternal welfare receipt on
children’s development using a sample comprised of children living in households that are categorically and income eligible to receive welfare benefits.
Consistent with previous studies, results from cross-sectional models indicate
that greater experience of welfare is significantly associated with poorer developmental outcomes for children as measured by the PIAT-math and reading
tests, and the BPI index. This negative effect does not seem to disappear com24

pletely even after controlling for a number of observable maternal and child
characteristics. However, the association between participation in AFDC/
TANF and poor child outcomes seems to disappear when omitted maternal or
child characteristics are controlled for using either models with family or individual fixed effects. Results from these models do not suggest the existence of
a significant causal relationship between welfare receipt and children’s cognitive
development.
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Efficiency of the Mutual Fund Industry:
an Examination of U.S. Domestic
Equity Funds: 1995-2004
By Chase Stewart

I. INTRODUCTION
Investors have the ability to choose between two different management styles
in the mutual fund industry. These two management styles differ in both the
investment strategy type the fund executes and management costs, which are
charged to the funds’ investors. First, investors may invest their funds in index
funds, which employ a passive investment strategy. Here, investors expect to
earn a rate of return equivalent to the market index—minus a small management
fee—which the fund seeks to track. Alternatively, investors may choose active
fund management. The returns of these mutual funds rely on stock selection
ability of portfolio managers. Active portfolio managers perform securities
research and obtain information in an attempt to distinguish between undervalued and overvalued securities—allowing them to outperform the market. To
compensate for the cost of this research, these funds generally charge a higher
management fee which is paid by individual mutual fund investors. In 2004, the
average actively managed fund expense ratio was approximately 140 basis points,
while the majority of index funds charge fees ranging from 10 basis points to 50
basis points. A expense ratio of 140 basis points would mean that $140 of every
$10,000 invested by an individual in a fund will go to the portfolio manager in
order to compensate them for their research and management. Some funds
carry further expenses in the form of load charges. They take a percentage of an
investors initial investment as a sales commission, as these funds are distributed
directly by the fund management company. Much debate within the investment
community has revolved around the question of whether the fees charged by
actively managed mutual funds are justified with higher returns.
In a model where information is costly to obtain and use during the stock
selection and market timing process, it is efficient for trades made by informed
investors to compensate them for their research [Grossman and Stiglitz,1980].
Thus, it should be found that active mutual fund managers will provide investors
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with returns higher than that of their index fund counterparts—offsetting the
higher fees paid for their management. And, in equilibrium, management fees
will be exactly equal to the cost born by management to obtain trading information. This type of model can be contrasted with a situation in which stock
information is free. In this situation, Fama [1970] states that security prices will
incorporate all available information. Under this form of the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis (EMH), investors would be irrational to invest in active funds, as efficiency in the market would make it impossible for them to outperform passive
index funds. In effect, investors would be paying portfolio managers to gather
information already imbedded in the market.
It will be the main focus of this paper to test for market efficiency in the
mutual fund industry under the conditions of costly information. The paper will
first begin with an overview of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the
Sharpe Ratio and review relevant studies on mutual fund performance. Next, the
CAPM and the Sharpe Ratio will be estimated for the funds in our sample and
compared to the overall market. From this analysis, it will be evaluated whether
active equity funds on average have had the ability to “beat the market” over the
period 1995-2004. This will be followed by a further analysis of industry cost
efficiency—updating previous studies by testing the effect of management fees
and load charges on fund returns with the most recently available data. This
analysis will be used to test for inefficiencies in our chosen model of market
efficiency. Last, the findings of this research will be summarized, and concluding
statements regarding its implications for rational investors will be made.
II. Portfolio Theory and Literature Review
The beginnings of modern portfolio theory came about in the early 1960s.
The following section will review two models of portfolio returns that have been
developed since that time. In addition, relevant studies on portfolio returns will
be examined.
A. The Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Sharpe Ratio
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was developed by Sharpe [1964]
and others over the course of the 1960s. This model explains portfolio and
security returns with the following equation:
E ( Ri ) = RFR + b ( RM − RFR)
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Here, a portfolio’s or security’s expected return is equal to the return of the risk
free rate (RFR) and its correlation with the return of the market (RM)—defined
by its Beta. The CAPM assumes that no other factors affect a portfolio’s expected
return—thus the CAPM expects no abnormal return. Typically, the CAPM in
used in empirical research in the following form developed by Jensen [1968]:
Rt − RFRt = a + b ( RMt − RFRt )

The constant term is often referred to as “Jensen’s Alpha.” Alpha is the measure
of abnormal return in this form of the CAPM equation (again, expected to be
zero). Jensen [1968] found, using data on all mutual funds from 1945-1964,
that the mean alpha of funds was negative—leading him to conclude that the
majority of mutual funds could not on average “beat the market.” However, Ippolito [1989] found contradicting evidence, as the mean alpha for funds in his
study was positive—leading him to conclude that it was possible for a random
selection of funds to outperform the market. In addition, Ippolito [1989] used
regression analysis to further support his findings, finding that expenses did not
have a statistically significant relationship with fund returns. Using the same
time period and methodology, Elton et al. [1993] found contradictory findings
to that of Ippolito when adding a proxy variable for non-S&P500 stocks into
the model.
The first section of this paper will update these previous studies with data
on all domestic mutual funds (ex-specialty funds) over the ten year period
1995-2004. Both the CAPM equation and the Sharpe Ratio of risk-adjusted
returns will be used to test whether active funds have the ability to outperform
the market. While very similar, Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe Ratio differ in
their definition of risk. The CAPM equation defines risk as volatility from the
market portfolio—systematic risk. On the other hand, the Sharpe Ratio uses a
portfolio’s standard deviation as its proxy for risk, which measures total risk.
The Sharpe Ratio is defined by the equation:
SR =

R t − RFR t
st

The numerator is the average portfolio return in period t minus the average riskfree rate of return over period t. The denominator of the equation is the standard
deviation of those returns—resulting in a composite measure of portfolio performance indicating the risk premium earned per unit of total risk. By comparing
the Sharpe Ratio of a fund to that of the market portfolio, one can gauge the
superiority or inferiority of that fund’s returns [Reilly and Brown, 2003].
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B. The Role of Costs in Mutual Fund Performance
Previous studies have found contradictory evidence in regards to the role
of management fees on fund performance. Early studies by Friend et al. [1970],
Jensen [1968], and Sharpe [1966] all found that mutual funds do not earn rates of
return high enough to offset their expenses. More recently, Bogle [1998] found
similar results by testing over a ten year period ending in 2001 and a five year
period ending in 1997. In our model of efficiency, these results would lead us
to assume that the mutual fund industry is not in equilibrium. Other studies,
however, have found that funds do achieve returns that are sufficient enough
to offset their costs. As discussed above, the most notable of these studies was
done by Ippolito [1989]. Like the work of Ippolito, the main focus of this paper
will be to update previous studies and test for market efficiency in the mutual
fund industry using CAPM methodology. In addition, the Sharpe Ratio will
be used to further examine the nature of returns and costs in the mutual fund
industry.
III. Analysis of Risk-Adjusted Returns
A. Sample Selection
The sample used throughout this paper includes all U.S. domestic equity
funds (ex-specialty funds). All historical data was obtained from the Morningstar, Inc. Premium Mutual Fund Screener, which holds up to ten years of
historical data for currently existing funds. As with Jensen [1968], this sample
suffers from survivorship bias, as only funds still existing currently are available
to be selected in the sample. To meet the sample selection criteria, a fund had
to have ten years of available historical data. In addition, all index funds and
institutional funds were removed from the sample. Using the selection criteria,
962 funds were included in the sample. Information on returns, expense ratios,
and load fees were all obtained from the Morningstar, Inc. Premium Mutual
Fund Screener database. Other variables used in this section and those that
follow are derived or calculated from this data.
B. Jensen’s Alpha, 1995-2004
For each fund in the sample set, Jensen’s form of the CAPM equation was
estimated:
(1) Rt − RFRt = a + b ( RMt − RFRt ) + e t , t = 1995-2004,
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where Rt is the rate of return for the fund in year t. This return is net of all
management fees except load charges. The variable RFRt is the risk-free rate of
return in year t, as measured by the return of U.S. Treasury Bills [Damodaran,
2005]. The rate of return in year t of the market portfolio, defined here as the
S&P 500, is denoted RMt [Damodaran, 2005]. Remember that the CAPM has an
E[α] = 0; however, superior portfolio managers who have market timing ability
or can consistently select undervalued securities will earn higher risk premiums
than the CAPM predicts. In terms of the regression, superior portfolio managers will
have consistently positive random error terms—resulting in a positive constant
term, or alpha. Consistent inferior performance in turn would lead to a negative
alpha [Reilly and Brown, 2003].
Based on the 95 percent level of confidence, it was found that of the 962
mutual funds analyzed, 905 were characterized by alphas statistically indistinguishable from zero, 12 by statistically significant positive alphas, and 45 by
statistically significant negative alphas. These results are summarized in TABLE
I with the findings of Jensen [1968] and Ippolito [1989]. The mean alpha for the
sample was -0.17 percent, indicating that the funds in the sample, on average,
had inferior performance compared to the overall market. These results were
similar to those found by Jensen [1968].
TABLE I
Alphas for U.S. Domestic Equity Funds
		
Zeroa Positive Negative Total
						

Mean
Alpha

Mean
Beta

Current Study, 1995-2004

905

12

45

962

-0.17

0.83

Ippolito, 1965-1984

127

12

4

143

0.81

0.88

Jensen, 1945-1964

98

3

14

115

-1.1

0.84

b

						

a. Alphas are classified as zero if the absolute t-values of the estimated alpha coefficients are less than 2.306, which entails the 95%
confidence interval, two-tail test
b. Fifty-six funds in the Jensen study were based on annual data from 1945-1964; the remaining results were based on annual data
from 1955-1964

FIGURE I

Current Study, 1995-2004
positive 1%

Ippolito, 1965-1984
positive 8%

negative 5%

negative
12%

negative 3%

zero
94%

Jensen, 1945-1964
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zero
89%

positive
3%

zero
85%

C. Sharpe Ratio, 1995-2004
Similar to the section above, a Sharpe Ratio was calculated for each of the
962 funds in the sample. The Geometric Sharpe Ratio, denoted in the following
equation, was used:

R t − RFR t , t = ten year period ending Dec. 31, 2004,
(2) 			
SR =
st
is the compound annual growth rate (CAGR), or geometric rate of
where t < 1985
return, for each mutual fund from 1995-2004; and RFR t is the CAGR for U.S.
treasury bills over the same period. The variable σt is the geometric standard
deviation of fund returns over the ten year period. The results on this analysis
are found in Table II.
The Sharpe Ratio for the market (S&P 500 index), is approximately 0.21.
Under portfolio theory, this figure represents the risk-adjusted return falling on
the Capital Market Line [Reilly and Brown, 2003]. Thus, a fund with a higher
Sharpe Ratio would have earned a risk-adjusted return in excess of the market.
For the 962 funds, only 384 were able to earn returns above the Capital
Market Line. This represents approximately 40 percent of the mutual funds in
the sample. The mean Sharpe Ratio was 0.17654, approximately 0.035 below
the return obtained by the S&P 500 market index. This result is similar to that
found using Jensen’s alpha—revealing that the funds in the sample failed to “beat
the market” on risk-adjusted terms.
TABLE II
Sharpe Ratio for U.S. Domestic Equity Funds
		
		
		

Sharpe
Ratio of
S&P 500

Current Study, 1995-2004

0.2109878

Funds
Funds 		
Outperforming Underperforming
Total
384

578

962

Mean 		
Sharpe Ratio
0.17654

IV. Cost Efficiency of U.S. Domestic Equity Mutual Funds
A. Model of Mutual Fund Cost Efficiency
In the model of efficiency tested in this paper, costs play the central role.
Under forms of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) where security prices
reflect all available information, there is no possible way for informed (active)
portfolio managers to outperform the market. Thus, investors placing their
savings in actively managed mutual funds are playing a loser’s game, as they are
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paying fees to reimburse mutual fund managers for collecting and trading on
information that is already reflected in market prices. Ippolito [1989] asserts
that this type of market equilibrium is flawed. If information is costly to obtain
and implement, then equilibrium, in which securities reflect all information,
makes it impossible for the market to compensate for information-gathering
activities. Thus, if the mutual fund industry is occupied by rational investors,
active funds would eventually cease to exist as investors would recognize this
impossibility.
Instead of assuming that the existence of active funds is irrational, we assume a
different model of efficiency in the mutual fund industry which is used by Ippolito
[1989]. In this model, Ippolito [1989] supposes that there are a certain number
of informed traders that are able to generate a wedge between trade prices and
full-information prices by gathering information. In equilibrium, passive investors essentially pay informed traders a sufficient amount to compensate for the
market arbitrage function [Grossman, 1976]. Thus, informed traders “beat the
market” before expenses, but make no excess returns after netting out the costs
borne during the information-gathering activity (if this were not the case and
informed traders “beat the market” after netting out expenses, it would pay for
more investors to become informed). So, in equilibrium, there is no incentive to
favor an actively managed fund or a passively managed index fund.
To test this model of efficiency, OLS methodology will be used to examine
whether expense ratios and load fees have any impact on the risk-adjusted rate
of return earned by all funds in the sample.
B. Specification
As with our earlier analysis, both Jensen’s CAPM equation and the Geometric
Sharpe Ratio will be used. For the CAPM, the following OLS equations will be used:
(3) Rt − RFRt = bb i ( RMt − RFRt ) + cEi + dLi + eMFi + fYt + e t , t = 1995-2004
where βi is the fund beta estimated from equation one. Thus, coefficient of this
variable should be statistically insignificant from one. The variable Ei denotes
the fund’s expense ratio as of Dec 31, 2004; and Li is a dummy variable indicating
whether a mutual fund charges a load fee.
It should be noted that this regression uses panel data derived from our
original sample. Thus, each fund has ten observations, one for each year of
the sample period. The variables MFi and Yt are vectors of mutual fund and
year dummies. These vectors are used to account for correlations between the
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residual across funds and years [Ippolito, 1989]. Due to constraints of our estimation capabilities of our available statistical software, the sample size had to be
reduced. A random sampling of 750 funds was selected from the original 962.
It is assumed that this sampling has little to no effect on the empirical results of
the regression analysis.
Similar regressions are run using the Geometric Sharpe Ratio. The return
measure used in the equation is the ratio of the fund minus that of the S&P 500
index:
(4) SRt − SRS & P 500,t = a + bEi + cLi + e t , t = 1995-2004
The entire sample of 962 funds was used for this regression. The results of both
regressions are shown in TABLE III and TABLE IV.
D. Empirical Results of Cost Efficiency
The results from the OLS regressions indicate that mutual funds are not
cost efficient as the theoretical model suggests. For cost efficiency to hold, one
would expect the coefficients on the expense ratio variable in the regressions
to be insignificant from zero; however, this only held true using equation 5. In
all other instances, there was a strong negative relationship between a fund’s
expense ratio and its return. The estimated coefficients on the expense variable
suggest that for each unit increase in Ei, the fund’s return decreased anywhere
from 0.86 to 2.5 percent from its expected value in the CAPM.
TABLE III
Effect of Expenses and Load fees on Performance [Rt-RFRt], 1995-2004
Variable

Mean
βt[RMt-RFRt]
8.159
		
Expense Ratio
1.420
		
Loada
0.405
		
Mutual fund and year dummy variablesb
X
2
R 		
Observations		
a. Load is a dummy variable equal to one for funds with load charges
b. Includes a dummy variable for each mutual fund and one for each year
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(3)
1.00		
(41.03)		
-1.65		
(-4.08)		
10.33		
(2.40)		
X		
0.73		
7500

It is unclear whether those funds charging loads earn returns sufficient to
offset the additional fee charged to investors. By law, a mutual fund may charge
up to an 8.50 percent load charge [Ippolito, 1989]. The results obtained by
equation 3 indicate that such a fee would be offset typically within one to five
years of the purchase of the fund. On the other hand, the results obtained by
equation 4 indicate that funds charging a load fee do not earn returns higher or
lower than no-load funds.
TABLE IV
Effect of Expenses and Load fees on Performance
[Sharpefund-SharpeS&P500], 1995-2004
Variable
Mean
Expense Ratio
1.431
		
Loada
0.395
		
Constant
X
		
R2		
Observations		

(4)
-0.15		
(16.35)		
-0.018		
(0.49)		
0.19		
(1.25)		
0.22		
962

a. Load is a dummy variable equal to one for funds with load charges

V. Conclusion
This paper examined cost efficiency in mutual fund industry using a model
in which it is costly for portfolio managers obtain information about securities.
The data and methodology are similar to that of several papers ranging in time
from the 1960s to the 1990s, most notably that of Ippolito [1989] and Jensen
[1968]. The CAPM and Sharpe Ratio were used to analyze the risk-adjusted
returns of 962 U.S. domestic equity mutual funds over the period 1995-2004.
It was found that actively managed funds failed to meet their objective
and outperform the market, defined by this study as the S&P 500 index, on a
risk-adjusted basis. The overall mean alpha for the mutual fund industry was
-0.17, with 45 funds characterized by statistically significant negative alphas,
and only 12 funds with statistically significant positive alphas. In addition,
only 40 percent of funds in the sample were found to outperform the Capital
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Market Line over the ten year period when using the Sharpe Ratio as a proxy
of risk-adjusted returns. The results found using the CAPM were similar to
that of Jensen [1968], but contradictory to those found by Ippolito [1968]. The
presence of such contradictory results should lead to future research to find
why the industry alpha in the mutual fund industry changes over time or differs
depending on the sample period.
Following the methodology of Ippolito [1989], OLS regression analysis was
also used to assess cost efficiency in the mutual fund industry. In the equilibrium
of the model tested, portfolio managers were assumed to be able to outperform
the market by an amount exactly equal to the cost required to obtain and use the
information which they used to trade—thus, investors earn the same return in
index funds and active funds. Results, using OLS methodology, did not support
evidence that the mutual fund industry was in equilibrium during the sample
period, or even perhaps that such a model governs the mutual fund industry. It
was found that funds with higher expense ratios, on average, earned lower rates
of return after expenses. Thus, these funds did not earn rates of return that were
sufficient to offset the higher management fees they charge investors. From the
analysis presented in this paper, it is unclear whether funds charging load fees
did earn rates of return that were sufficient to offset their sales charges. The
regression based off of the CAPM showed that a load charge would be offset
by higher returns within a one to five year period on average. However, the
regression using the Sharpe Ratio indicated that load funds earn returns that
are insignificantly different from no-load funds.
These results suggest that rational investors should take expense ratios into
account when making mutual fund investment decisions, and might consider
cheap passive portfolio management as a superior option to that of active fund
management. Although, it should be reiterated that the results presented in this
paper are in alignment with some past studies, while contradictory to others.
This suggests that studies on mutual fund efficiency may be dependent on both
the methodology and, more importantly, the time periods used in the study.
Future research using multiple long-term time periods might shed more light
on the effects of costs on mutual fund returns.
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Appendix A: DATA DEFINITIONS
Listed below are the data definitions of all fund variables obtained from the
Morningstar Premium Fund Screener database:
Expense Ratio
The expense ratio of a mutual fund expresses the percentage of assets deducted each fiscal year for fund expenses. These expenses include 12b-1 fees,
management fees, administrative fees, operating costs, and all other asset-based
cost incurred by the fund. The expense ratios used in this analysis are those
reported as of December 31st of 2004 by each fund. It should be noted that
these expense ratios for trailing returns-as year by year expense ratio data was
not available. Therefore, it is an implicit assumption of this analysis that the
expenses of these equity funds have either all stayed the same for the past five
years or have all changed up or down by the same proportion over the various
time periods.
Fund Returns
Annual total returns are calculated on a calendar-year basis. This return
includes both income, given in the forms of dividends, and capital gains or losses.
Morningstar, Inc. calculates total return by taking the change in the fund’s NAV,
assuming reinvestment of all income and capital gains distributions during the
period, and then dividing by the initial NAV. These returns are adjusted for
expenses included in a funds expense ratio.
No-Load Funds
No load funds are sold to do-it-yourself investors and thus carry no sales charge.
Because of the variety and complexity of possible sales charges and marketing
fees, it is difficult to create hard and fast rules that separate load and no-load
funds. Morningstar currently defines no-load funds as those offerings that
have no front-end or deferred load, and a 12b-1 fee less than or equal to 0.25%
per year.
Other Data Issues-Survivorship Bias
Like many other studies dealing with mutual funds, this analysis must deal
with fund survivorship. For this study, only funds which still exist today will be
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included-as data for funds that have closed were not available. This issue also
creates another issue for analyzing past returns of funds. Since poor performers tend to drop out while strong performers continue to operate, this cause an
overestimation of past returns. This is known as survivorship bias. Assuming
that more active funds drop out over time (as poor performance is usually defined
by trailing a benchmark/index), it may be appropriate to keep in mind that the
overall average returns for active funds is overstated in this study. For example,
the Wall Street Journal reported in 1997 that during the time period 1982-1992
mutual funds reported average returns of 18.1%. When survivorship bias was
taken into account, average fund returns were taken down to 16.3%.
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The Effects of
Sexual Orientation on Earnings
Tsz Ying Yeung

I. Introduction
Gay and lesbian topics have received much media attention in recent
years. Debates have revolved around issues such as gay marriage, adoption rights,
and the legal relationship of children born to a homosexual couple with their nonbiological second parent. Corporations have started to provide partner benefits to
gay and lesbian employees. Many companies today have added the words “sexual
orientation” to their equal rights hiring policies. Nevertheless, discrimination
against homosexual people in the workplace is still widely perceived to exist.
In this paper, I address the question, does earnings discrimination
against homosexual and bisexual workers exist in the U.S. labor market? Homophobia can greatly affect homosexual workers’ productivity. “It is homophobia in the workplace that tells me I am not safe, that I must keep on the mask.”
(McNaught 8) Sexual preference stigma can cause homosexual workers stress
and anxiety, which is likely to have a negative effect on their working ability.
Public discourse about such issues may be important for de-stigmatizing homosexual workers. Moreover, quantitative information about the
working conditions of lesbian, gay, or bisexual (LGB) people in the office would
be interesting for members of that group and for their advocates. This topic
is of great concern to those economists who would want to promote policy to
protect homosexuals. For example, if there is empirical evidence indicating the
existence of discrimination in the workplace, then policy makers may decide to
implement more effective non-discriminatory laws in the labor market. Finally,
society in general may be interested in this topic as well.
In the next section, I review the previous academic literature on the effects
of sexual orientation on earnings. In the third section, I outline the empirical model
of the present study. In section four, I discuss the data collected to test my hypothesis whether homosexual and bisexual workers are discriminated against in the
workforce, and in section five I apply what I have discovered from my econometric
analysis to draw conclusion on the effects of sexual orientation on earnings.
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II. Literature Review
Literature examining the impact of earnings discrimination on homosexual workers has increased since the first econometric study by Badgett
(1995). Badgett used General Social Survey (GSS) data for the years of 1989-91
to examine wage discrimination against gay, lesbian, and bisexual groups. Badgett
assumed that people who answered that they had more same-sex partners than
opposite-sex partners in the past belonged to the LGB group. Badgett found that
gay and bisexual male workers earned between 11 percent and 27 percent less
than similarly qualified heterosexual males, while lesbian and bisexual women
were not significantly different from heterosexual women. Similar studies using
more recent GSS data have shown slightly different results than Badgett’s paper.
Blandford (2000) and Black et al. (2003) analysis of the GSS data of 1989-96 found
an earnings penalty for gay men compared to heterosexual males and an earnings
premium for lesbian women compared to heterosexual women. Blandford’s result
was a 30 – 32 percent earnings penalty for behaviorally gay men, and a 17 - 23
percent increase in earnings for behaviorally lesbian women. Correspondingly,
Black et al. found that gay men earned 14 -16 percent less, while lesbian women
earned 20 - 34 percent more. Berg and Lien (2002) using GSS data of 1991-1996
found results similar to those of Blandford and Black et al.
Some studies have also used data from the 1990 U.S. Census (PUMS 5
percent) to examine the effects of sexual orientation on labor market earnings.
Klawitter and Flatt (1998) and Allegretto and Arthur (2001) consider the effects
of sexual preferences on three types of couples: married (heterosexual), unmarried heterosexual, and homosexual. Both articles found that men in homosexual
couples earned the most among all types of couples. Married heterosexual men
earn more than coupled female homosexuals, and further, females in homosexual
couples earn more than unmarried heterosexual females. These income gaps
suggest the existence of a marriage premium, since it is unmarried female and
male heterosexuals who earn the least of all. Their results are consistent with
previous studies based on GSS data: gay men are found to earn less income
than heterosexual males while lesbian women are found to earn more than
their comparable heterosexuals. Additionally, their results suggest that married
heterosexual men earn more than both homosexual men and unmarried heterosexual men. On the other hand, homosexual females are found to earn more
than both unmarried heterosexual women and married heterosexual women.
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The studies above indicate that, gay men can expect to earn less than heterosexual
men, and lesbian women can expect to earn more than heterosexual women.
To explain these disparities, Berg and Lien argue that heterosexual women and
gay men have different budget constraints which keep them from choosing
higher levels of work. They suggest that men and woman may have different
preferences for the trade-off between labor and leisure. For example, cultural
norms posit that married heterosexual women should stay at home after they
have children and men should work more to support the family. Similarly, Black
et al. argued that married women tend to specialize in home production and
as a result they tend to invest less in their human capital accumulation. On the
other hand, married men specialize in wage-labor and therefore tend to invest
relatively more in their human capital.
In a study utilizing data from the Netherlands, a country that has legalized same-sex marriage, Plug and Berkhout (2004) uses a large survey of Dutch
university graduates to examine the effects of sexual orientation on entry-level
job earnings. They found a 3 percent income penalty on gay men’s earnings
compared with those of heterosexual males, and a 3 percent income premium
on lesbian women’s earnings compared with those of heterosexual females. Additionally, they did not observe the existence of an earnings gender gap among
homosexual workers. Based on their findings, they concluded that the Dutch
labor market does not discriminate against homosexual workers at the job-entry
level. In one of the most recent US studies on this topic, Carpenter (2005)
uses confidential data on self-reported sexual orientation in California in 2001
and GSS data from 1988 to 2000 to examine the effects of sexual orientation on
earnings. Carpenter finds little evidence that homosexual workers earn less
than heterosexual workers. However, he finds a 10 percent income penalty on
bisexual workers’ earnings compared with the earnings of similarly qualified
heterosexual workers in California.
My project will examine the impact of sexual orientation on wages by
using GSS data from 1972 to 2004. My methodological approach consists of
testing whether there are any differences between the earnings of heterosexual,
homosexual and bisexual people who have similar backgrounds. To distinguish
whether a person belongs in the homosexual group, I will use the following definition: a homosexual is a person who has had exclusively same sex partners in
the past 12 months while a heterosexual is a person who has only had opposite
sex relationships. Similarly, a bisexual is a person who has sexual relationships
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with both sexes. I use the newest GSS data available to examine the earnings
differential between heterosexual and homosexual workers. Some research papers (Allegretto & Arthur, 2001; Klawitter and Flatt, 1998) used the 1990 Census
data. Census data identified only partnered lesbian and gay groups and hence it
is not a probability sample of all lesbian women and gay men. It is also possible
that the numbers of gay and lesbian individuals to have come “out” has increased
since 1990 because of increased social acceptance. Therefore, the updated GSS
data that I use will improve on the various weaknesses of past data. 			
III. Modeling
I first use the traditional statistical earnings equations to assess the
income differential between homosexuals and heterosexuals. Specifically, I
estimate wage equations in which I regress log income on a dummy variable
indicating sexual orientation and on various other socioeconomic characteristics which might affect income. Then I use the Heckman Selection model to
examine the relationship between self-selected workers in the labor force and
their earnings difference. I restrict my sample to those between eighteen and
sixty-four. I estimate separate equations for male and female wage earners.
These wage equations are formally given by the following econometric model:
Yi = α + βiXi +εi
where Yi is a vector of log respondent’s real income and Xi is a vector of demographic variables including sexual orientations, occupations, education levels,
race, experience and experience squared. Gay/Lesbian is a dummy variable
equal to one if the respondent has engaged only in same-sex relationships in the
last twelve months. Bisexual is also a 0-1 dummy variable, assuming a value of
one if the respondent has reported having a relationship with both female and
male partners in the last twelve months. Similarly, Heterosexual is a dummy
variable equal to one if the respondent has reported only opposite sex partners.
Occupation is a vector of indicator variables for 13 broad job categories. Race
is a dummy variable assuming a value of one if the respondent is white and zero
if otherwise. Experience is calculated as follows:
Experience = Age – Years of Education – 5
Labor market experience is included in the model to capture the effects of individual characteristics, such as productivity, seniority, and on the job training,
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that are likely to affect earnings. A squared term in experience is included to
capture the non-linearity in the experience-earnings profiles.
Working Status is a vector of dummy variables indicating employment
status, and region is a vector of indicator variables for 9 different (Census)
regions in the US. Marital status is also a dummy variable indicating whether
the respondent was widowed, divorced, separated, never married or married.
Married is the base variable, since homosexual marriage is not legal in the US,
and it would be difficult to explain the income difference if married homosexuals were included in the data. Lastly, ε is an error term that is assumed to be
uncorrelated across individuals but permitted to be correlated within individuals
over time. Therefore, the model is estimated using robust regression methods.
The regression model for the Heckman Selection model is formulated similarly
to the wage equation above. However, it is observed only when those workers
who work full-time earn a positive income.
The selection Mechanism and regression model are given by the following
(Green, 1992):
Selection Mechanism
Z*i = g ′Wi
Wi + n i ,
Zi = 1

if Z *i ≤ 0 ,

Zi = 0

if Z *i ≤ 0 ,

Wi ),
Prob (Zi = 1) = Φ ( g ′Wi
Prob (Zi = 0) = 1 - Φ ( g ′Wi
Wi ).
Regression Model
Yi = α + βiXi +εi, observed only if Zi = 1,
(n i ,εi ) ~ bivariate normal [0,0,1,σε, ρ]
where Z*i represents a dummy variable assuming a value of one if a worker works
full-time and earns positive income (sample1). Wi is a vector of socioeconomic
characteristics and sexual orientation variables, as well as other variables such
as region and marital status which might affect earnings.
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IV. Data
This study draws on pooled, cross-sectional data from the 1972 – 2004
administrations of the General Social Survey (GSS), conducted by the National
Opinion Research Center (NORC). The GSS is an extensive survey of U.S.
households and includes information on various labor market characteristics
such as income, working hours, and occupations. The GSS also collected information on the number and gender of respondents’ sexual partners in the last
twelve months and in the past five years. My analysis relies on data from these
surveys, as well as on a few assumptions about sexual behavior and identity.
An ideal data set for testing my hypothesis would be a set that accurately
documents the earnings and possible hiring discrimination of LGB people in
comparison with similarly qualified heterosexuals. Moreover, a data set that
classifies homosexuals on the basis of self identification rather than according to
their sexual partners is desirable. This data is difficult to acquire as differences
in earnings and hiring may be correlated with other factors. For example, LGB
people may be underrepresented in statistical research because stigma may keep
them from reporting sexuality based discrimination. Alternatively, advocates
of homosexual groups could falsely report themselves to have had same-sex
partners in the past. These untruthful survey responses could cause estimation
problems. Finally, honesty of the survey response for being in the homosexual
group may be correlated with income, which in turn may cause further problems
in the data set. 1
It is possible that if homosexual marriage is legalized, data collection
on these groups’ earnings will become more accurate or widely perceived. At
present, the GSS is one of the richest data sets that contain information on
working history, sexual preferences, and labor market outcomes. Therefore, I
utilize these data to examine the impact of sexual orientation on earnings. I created dummy variables for sexual orientation based on the respondents’ sexual
partner histories in the last twelve months as opposed to their sexual partner
histories in past five years. The advantage of using the last twelve month sex
partners’ sample rather than the past five year sex partners’ sample is that the
former includes a larger number of homosexual respondents.
However, a potential disadvantage with this approach is that people’s sexual
For instance, if only low-income homosexual groups reveal truthful information, while high-income homosexual groups hide
to tell their true sexual orientation, this could create an income gap between homosexual and heterosexual groups.

1
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preferences may vary more during a longer period of time and so individuals
who are classified as homosexual in a given survey year might have also had
opposite-sex relationships over the past five years. In fact, as shown in Figure
1, fewer people report sexual relationships with both sexes in the past twelve
months than in the past five years. Thus, my sample contains only a limited
number of bisexual workers.
The GSS data provide respondents with the choice of not disclosing
their sexual preferences. I assume that all respondents who do not reveal their
sexual preferences are sexually inactive and they serve as the excluded group in
the regression analysis.2
All of the job occupation variables are created by combining similar
job categories from the survey indicated. For instance, the survey has several
choices of being a professional, and so I combined them into a single variable
called professional. Similarly, I grouped various other jobs into broader categories. For example, the variable Sales is derived by combining various kinds
of sales workers (shoes, radio, apparel, etc.). Figure 2 in the appendix shows
mean annual income classified by female sexual orientation. As the histogram
indicates, lesbian females earn on average the most, $21,102.46 and heterosexual
females earn on average more than bisexual and sexually inactive females. For
the male sample, Figure 3 indicates that heterosexual male workers earn on
average $28,367.32, which is slightly more than the average income of gay male
workers who earn $24,693.58. Bisexual male workers earn the least among the
four groups. Figure 4 shows mean annual income versus occupation. As the
histogram indicates, executives earn on average the most, $34,465.18, followed
by professionals, $28,717.20. Figure 5 plots sexual orientation versus education levels and indicates that about half of all homosexual and bisexual workers
have attained a high school degree. Compared with heterosexual and bisexual
workers, a higher percentage of homosexual workers attain tertiary educational
degrees (bachelor and graduate). Descriptive statistics of each variable in the
wage equations and the Heckman selection model are provided in Table 1 in the
appendix. Table 1 shows the 13 occupations and 7 working statuses mentioned
previously. Moreover, it shows that the dataset contains 6 types of educational
degrees, 5 types of marital statuses and 9 different US regions. Variables for
experience and race are also included. Instead of using the absolute earnings
2

The number of sexually inactive people is likely to be over-estimated because it is not based on their actual sexual experiences.
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in the regression analysis, I take the logarithm in order to address the possible
non-linear relationship between income and other regressors. Gay, lesbian and
bisexual are defined as described in Table 1. There are 205 gay and 44 bisexual
men among the 6,729 male respondents, while 149 lesbian and 47 bisexual
women are identified among the 7,931 females in the full sample.3
V. Results
I estimate two similar regressions for the female and male samples
to capture the effect of sexual orientation under different circumstances. The
interpretation of the impact of the dummy variables on log income is given by
(Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980):
(2)
Percentage = 100 * (exp (c- V(c)/2) – 1)
where c is the estimated coefficient on a dummy variable and V(c) is the estimated
variance of c which is equal to the square of the estimated standard error ( b ).
Table 2 presents the wage equation regression results for both females
and males. In this model, I regress log income on several dummy variables that
indicate sexual preference, job, education level, experience, experience-squared
and race. For the male sample, gay men earn 21.93 percent less than similarly
qualified sexually inactive workers. Compared to sexually inactive workers,
bisexual males earn a 33.45 percent penalty, whereas heterosexual males earn a
5.85 percent penalty. Correspondingly, executives earn an income premium of
30.13 percent (significant at 1 percent). Cleaners, farmers, fishermen, service
employees and administrative supports earn less than professionals, which is
consistent with the descriptive analysis (see Figure 4). With regards to race, black
men earn 19.20 percent less than whites, which is consistent with the findings
of the labor market literature. The coefficients on experience and experiencesquared are as expected. Experience has a positive effect on income, whereas
experience-squared has a negative impact on income because of diminishing
marginal returns of experience to income.
For the female sample, the results suggest that lesbian workers earn
a 37.22 percent earnings premium (1 percent level of statistical significance),
whereas bisexual females are imposed a 16.95 percent earnings penalty, although

3

Note: Since not all gays, lesbians, and bisexuals participate in the labor force, in the regression analysis I include only those 		
GLB individuals who have worked for a wage.
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this number is statistically insignificant. Education levels are strongly and
positively correlated with earnings - the higher the degree earned, the higher
the earnings. Compared with workers who have earned a high school degree,
workers who have not completed high school earn 31.72 percent less, whereas
workers who have earned a degree above high school earn from 38 percent
to 129 percent more. Regarding occupations, the coefficient on the executive
variable is positive, which indicates that a professional (the excluded occupation) who switches to become an executive will experience a marginal increase
in earnings. The interpretation of the coefficients on the other occupation
variables is similar. For the race variables, black females earn 5.5 percent more
than white females. This result contradicts the common empirical observation
that whites earn relatively more than blacks. The two experience variables are
again consistent with economic theory.
Results for the female sample obtained under the traditional wage
equation are inconsistent with the sexual orientation discrimination theory
since they indicate that lesbian women earn relatively more than heterosexual
females. The existence of income penalties for gay male workers may indicate
that sexual orientation discrimination exists in the labor force. Hence it is not
to easy to explain why society will favor lesbian women but it will discriminate
against gay male workers. One possible explanation is that there is a selection
bias in the simple wage equation regression. In other words, certain types of
workers are more likely to select themselves into the labor force. I use the Heckman selection model to correct for this possible bias in the simple wage equation. This correction for differential selection explained by sexual orientation is
likely to provide better estimates of the income disparity between homosexual,
bisexual and heterosexual workers.
Table 3 shows the result for this Heckman selection model, which is
similar to the wage equation where log income is the dependent variable. I ran
the regression separately for both the male and female samples. The selection
portion of the Heckman selection model includes not only the independent
variables that were in the original wage equation, but also the region and marital
variables. For the male sample, the wage equation shows that gay males earn
a 14.90 percent penalty compared with sexually inactive workers. In the selection part of the model, gay male workers are more likely to work full-time than
sexually inactive men. Results for bisexual male workers are insignificant under
the Heckman selection model but the coefficient in the wage equation suggests
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that bisexual male workers earn an income penalty. While heterosexual male
workers are found to earn a 7.12 percent income penalty compared with sexually
inactive male worker in the wage equation, they are more likely than sexually
inactive males to work full-time. This indicates that heterosexual male workers
are more likely to select themselves in paid full-time work than are bisexual and
sexually inactive males. The education variables are all significant at the 1 percent
confidence level. Along with increases in educational level, earnings grow less
rapidly in the paid full-time selectivity model than in the simple wage equation
model. For example, in the regression model, a worker who completed graduate school earns an 83.49 percent premium relative to a high school graduate,
whereas in the selection model, a graduate school graduate earns only a 28.20
percent income premium. These results suggest as expected that well-educated
people are more likely to select themselves into paid full-time work than are
less-educated people. Black male workers are expected to earn less compared
with white workers, and blacks are less likely select themselves into employment.
Both experience variables are statistically significant and they have the expected
signs in both the simple wage equation and selection models. In addition, a male
worker who works at a paid full-time job in New England, Middle and South
Atlantic, East-North or North-South Central earns from 11.15 percent to 15.85
percent higher income than a male worker located in West-North central.
With regard to marital status, a male worker who is married is more
likely to work for full-time than widowed, divorced, separated or never married
males. After controlling for selection in the labor force, the income penalty for
gay males does not seem to disappear and this in turn may suggest that there
is some discrimination against gay male workers in the workforce. However,
there is no strong evidence for the effect of sexual orientation on the earnings
of bisexual males. Lastly, the results also suggest that heterosexual male workers
are the most likely to select themselves into the work force.
For the female sample, under the Heckman selection model, the wage
equation shows a 0.75 percent (statistically insignificant) income premium for
lesbian workers compared with a 37.22 percent premium (1 percent level of
significance) in the OLS wage regression. These income premiums are relative
to the group of sexually inactive workers. Under the selection mechanism, the
results strongly confirm that lesbian workers are more likely to select themselves into full-time paid employment than are sexually inactive, heterosexual
or bisexual workers. The income premiums for lesbian workers found in the
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simple wage models disappear after controlling for selection. This result is
more consistent with the work discrimination theory in general, in which gay
male workers are earning a penalty and lesbian workers at least do not earn an
income premium compared with other heterosexual workers as some previous
studies have shown. The results found from the simple wage models, which
show that lesbian workers are earning a premium, are possibly driven by the
fact that lesbians are the most likely group of workers to select themselves into
full-time paid employment. Coefficients on bisexual female workers are statistically insignificant in all models, which is likely caused by the small number of
bisexual women in the sample. Heterosexual female workers earn 0.22 percent
less than sexually inactive female workers, although this result is insignificant.
Controlling for self-selection, heterosexual workers earn a 12.90 percent income
premium, which indicates that heterosexual females are more likely to work at a
paid full-time job than are sexually inactive females. However, compared with
lesbian workers, heterosexual female workers have weaker incentives to work.
As in the male sample, adding controls for self-selection reduces the magnitude
of the coefficients on all variables that indicate educational level. With regards
to race, black women earn a 9.47 percent income penalty compared with white
woman (significant at the 1 percent confidence level) after controlling for differential selection, although they are more likely than white women to work
full-time. For the experience variables, results are similar to those found for the
male sample and are also consistent with previous empirical research. In contrast
to male workers, married women workers are least likely among all women to
work full-time. These results are consistent with the traditional family model,
where women tend to specialize in home production, and men work for salary
to support financially the household.
Table 4 shows a Heckman selection model that is almost the same as
the one in table 2, the only difference being that it does not include the sexual
orientation variables. The main purpose of this model is to distinguish between
the earnings of people of different sexual orientation, if the model failed to
control for sexual orientation variables in the selection equation. For the male
sample, results for gay male workers are consistent with those from the previous models, which show that gay men earn an 11.89 percent income penalty.
Similarly, bisexual male workers earn 23.97 percent less than sexually inactive
workers, whereas heterosexual male workers earn 3.86 percent less. For the
female sample, lesbian women earn an income premium of 25.48 percent com56

pared with sexually inactive females (significant at the 1 percent confidence
level), while being bisexual has no significant effect on earnings. Heterosexual
female workers earn a 7.12 percent income premium.
These results indicate that lesbian workers earn a premium in both
the simple wage equation model that does not control for selection, and in the
selection model that does not include the sexual orientation variables in the
selection mechanism. However, when adding controls for sexual orientation
variables in the Heckman selection model, lesbian sexual orientation variables
no longer has a significant effect on earnings. Moreover, the results suggest
strong evidence that lesbian workers are more likely to select themselves into
paid full-time employment than both heterosexual and bisexual females.
VI. Conclusion
This study has revisited the effects of sexual orientation on income using
GSS data from 1972 to 2004. It provides some evidence on the income disparity
between homosexual, bisexual and heterosexual groups. Homosexual males
earn from 12 percent to 22 percent less than heterosexual males with similar
backgrounds. In contrast to some previous studies, homosexual females are not
found to earn an income premium relative to heterosexual and sexually inactive
women. However, results from the Heckman selection model suggest that lesbian
workers are more likely to select themselves into paid full-time jobs. Based on
this result, I conclude that lesbian workers are not favored by the labor market.
Results for both bisexual males and females do not show any evidence that being
bisexual has an effect on earnings. Lastly, findings show that consistent with
the traditional family models, married men are more likely to work for wages
than married women who tend to specialize in home production.
In the future, one can extend this research by using some confidential
data on sexual orientation with a larger sample size to capture additional effects
of sexual preferences on earnings. Furthermore, it may be useful to examine
a similar question in countries such as Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, England
and Canada4, where homosexual equality rights are more abundant than in the
US. Research on the labor market experience of homosexual people in these
countries may help US policy markers to de-stigmatize homosexuals in the US
labor market.
4

These are countries which have legalized same-sex marriage or union.
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Finally, the results of this study suggest that there is some evidence that
discrimination against gay male workers may after all exist in the labor market.
It is likely that discrimination based on sexual orientation has a negative impact
on the labor market experiences and earnings of non-heterosexual people. Hence
it is important that policy makers implement more effective antidiscrimination
laws in the US labor market.

58

Table 2: Wage Equation Model
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Table 3: Heckman Selection Model
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Table 4: Heckman Selection Model
(Sexual orientation variables are excluded)
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The Macroeconomy and Long-Term
Interest Rates: An Examination of
Recent Treasury Yields
Hans W. Hardisty
Introduction
From 2001 to 2006, U.S. long-term interest rates have remained steady
while the federal funds rate has both declined and increased, as Figure 1 shows.
Historically, long term interest rates tend to respond to changes in short term rates,
but recently this does not appear to be the case. Former chairman of the Federal
Reserve, Alan Greenspan, recently dubbed this occurrence a “conundrum,” because
no one can provide a distinct explanation concerning this phenomenon. There are
several noteworthy incentives for why long-term yields should have increased from
2004 to 2006, but they have remained constant during this time period. According to current economic theory, the U.S. budget deficit, the Federal Open Market
Committee’s (FOMC) recent increases in short term rates, the latest recovery
from recession, and the hefty current account deficit should all be contributing
to higher long-term rates. Despite these macroeconomic influences, rates have
not responded. Therefore, a supplementary force(s) must be creating a substantial
impact. For example, this trend may be explained by a decrease in interest rate
volatility, the Federal Reserve’s ability to maintain low inflation expectations, or
an increase in foreign demand for U.S Treasuries. Is the ten-year Treasury yield
truly a conundrum, or have macroeconomic influences caused long-term interest
rates to maintain at an appropriate level?
Over the years, much has been written about interest rates and their
interaction with macroeconomic variables. Both Ang and Piazzesi (2003), and
Wu (2002) establish that macro changes affect the slope of the yield curve. Ang
and Piazzesi confirm this argument with vector autoregression (VAR) analysis.
They use inflation, latent variables, macro growth, and real activity regressors
in their model. Their variables are able to explain up to 85% of the changes in
bond yields. The authors ascertain that economic adjustments lead to greater
alterations in short term securities, but they recognize that these variables influence long-term bonds as well. Wu (2002) also uses VAR analysis and finds that
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monetary policy can explain a significant portion of the movements in interest
rates. Wu’s paper establishes that the slope of the term structure is affected
by monetary policy shocks after 1982 by using a six-variable VAR model. The
variables used in the paper include the federal funds rate, industrial production,
payroll employment, the PCE deflator, monetary aggregate, and a smoothed
change in the index of sensitive material prices.
Diebold, Rudebush and Aruoba (2004) recognize that economists have
produced a number of models that attempt to explain interest rates, and they
mention that these models often vary in “form and fit.” In their paper, they follow the work of Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Hördahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2002)
and Wu (2002), to build a model that incorporates macroeconomic changes,
and evaluate the connection between these alterations and the yield curve. They
also use VAR analysis to confirm that the slope of the yield curve is affected
by real activity, inflation, and monetary policy. In their investigation, they find
strong confirmation that macroeconomic adjustments affect future interest rates
and less evidence in favor of the yield curve affecting future macroeconomic
changes.
Warnock and Warnock (2005) explain recent low long-term interest
rates by investigating foreign flows into the U.S. Treasury market. They build a
model that is similar to the one presented in Sack (2004). Their paper estimates
an ordinary least squares (OLS) model that explains the ten-year Treasury yield
using macroeconomic factors that are, according to current economic theory,
likely to influence this yield. The six explanatory variables include: inflation
and growth expectations, the budget deficit, the federal funds rate and a risk
premium.
In this paper, I build on the previous work regarding interest rates and
macroeconomic changes. I generate a six-variable OLS model that is similar
to the one created by Warnock and Warnock (2005), and I focus on the tenyear Treasury yield. Unlike the Warnock paper I use ten-year-ahead inflation
expectations as an explanatory variable. They proxy for inflation expectations
by subtracting one year expectations from ten-year expectations. In addition,
the survey data in my model derives from alternative sources.
With this model, I also use out-of-sample forecasting to confirm that
recent long-term interest rates have been unusually low. I extend my assessment and use VAR analysis using the same macro variables. In general, the VAR
estimations tend to agree with economic theory, and impulse response charts
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show that the estimators respond in the anticipated direction immediately after a
macro shock or several quarters after a shock. In addition, these graphs confirm
that the variables react similarly to the OLS results. Finally, I use this VAR to
do an additional out-of-sample forecast and reestablish that long-term interest
rates are slightly lower than the model would have anticipated, but the model
does a good job of predicting long-term interest rate levels.
Theories of the Term Structure
The term structure, also known as the yield curve, shows the relationship between the annual rate of return on an investment and maturity dates
for a set of similar bonds, usually Treasuries, at a given point in time. The U.S.
Treasury yield curve is used as an interest rate benchmark, because it is the most
frequently used and analyzed. Many risks associated with other fixed income
securities essentially do not exist with U.S. Treasuries. These bonds are issued
by the U.S. government, and the United States has never defaulted on a Treasury
payment. Consequently, there is negligible default and liquidity risk associated
with the Treasury Market, which makes these securities the safest, and one of
the most popular, investments in the world (Campbell 1995).
There are three theories that explain why the yield curve is shaped the
way that it is: the unbiased expectations theory, the liquidity premium theory,
and the market segmentation theory. Sanders (2004) explains that according to
the unbiased expectations theory, long-term interest rates can be considered an
average of current and expected future short term rates. The logic behind this
argument is that investors can choose to invest their money in one of two different
ways. If an individual wants to invest for 30 years, he can either opt to buy one
30 year bond and wait for it to mature, or each year he can buy 30 consecutive
one year bonds. If investors expect short term interest rates to increase during
the 30 years, then the yield on the 30 year bond should be higher than the short
term bonds. If investors expect average short term rates to decline during the
next thirty years then long term interest rates will fall. The general rules of supply
and demand should make the returns between these two investment strategies
identical. Saunders (2004) provided the equation below: where 1iN is the actual
rate today, N is the term to maturity, 1i1 is the actual current one year rate, and
E(NR1) are the expected future one year rates.
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Model A:

(1+1 i N )N = (1+1 i 1 )(1 + E (2 i 1 ))...(1 + E ( N i 1 ))
The liquidity premium theory is the same as the unbiased expectations
theory, but accounts for a liquidity risk, which increases with the maturity of
the bond. It states that investors would rather hold short term securities over
long-term securities. Typically, the yield curve is upward sloping because a
higher yield is required to entice investors to take on various risks associated
with longer maturities and to persuade them to tie up their money for longer
periods of time. The liquidity premium theory helps explain why long term interest rates tend to have higher yields. For example, the longer a person invests
in a fixed income security the greater the chance that a period of high inflation
will occur during the life of the bond. Since inflation reduces the value of an
investment, higher yields are typically associated with long-term bonds. These
premiums encourage investors to take on extra risk associated with uncertainty.
The longer the term to maturity, the greater the likelihood that the security will
see periods of higher short term yields. The uncertainty of future interest rates
and inflation levels must be compensated for. In summary, investors consider
short term securities less risky because of long-term interest rate uncertainty;
therefore, investors require a yield higher than the average expected short term
interest rates to entice them to buy long-term securities (Saunders 2004).
The market segmentation theory, which is also called the preferred
habitat hypothesis by Haubrich and Dombrosky (1995), states that different
maturity segments of the yield curve are imperfect substitutes, and according
to this theory investors and financial institutions have specific demands when it
comes to maturities. For example, banks may wish to hold short term securities,
but insurance companies may wish to hold long-term bonds (Saunders 2004).
As the supply of short term bonds decreases, or the demand for these securities
increases, the yield curve becomes steeper. Similarly, if the supply increases or
the demand decreases for long-term bonds the yield curve will become steeper.
The market segmentation theory also argues that investors are naturally unwilling to change their maturity preferences unless they are offered a significant
premium. Therefore, the typical upward slope of the yield curve is simply caused
by a greater demand for short term investments. Assuming that the yield curve
is segmented, a cumulative mathematical equation for these three theories can
be seen below, where Lt represents the risk premium described in the liquidity
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premium theory and the incentive premium discussed in the market segmentation theory. These risk premiums will vary based on the term to maturity.
Model B:
N

(1+1 i N ) = (1+1 i 1 )(1 + E (2 i 1 )+ L2 )...(1 + E ( N i 1 )+ LN )
Rates Should be Increasing
We can now use this economic theory to examine the present yield
curve. There are currently several economic forces that should be putting upward
pressure on long-term yields. The first example is associated with the current
budget deficit. The United States is currently facing a steadily increasing budget
deficit caused by increases in government spending and a reduction in tax revenue. Figure 2 shows that the U.S. government had deficits in the most recent
time periods. Governments will often borrow in the loanable funds market to
finance government spending that exceeds tax revenue. To fund government
projects and pay for current expenditures governments frequently borrow by
issuing their own debt. According to the loanable funds theory, the current increase in the supply of government debt should place pressure on interest rates
to rise. Higher returns lure more money towards these securities and investors
avoid investment and consumption expenditures. This crowding out occurrence
can lead to lower levels of future economic growth and reduce consumption
spending through a wealth effect.
Engen and Hubbard (2004) point out that the empirical results concerning government debts and interest rates fluctuate extensively. Many have
established a correlation between these two variables, but others find contrasting
results. Regardless, they establish that a one percent increase in government debt
can lead to an approximately 3 basis point change in the ten year bond rate.
Another economic activity that should have caused long-term rates
to increase is related to the FOMC’s recent increases in short term rates. In
the past, gradual increases in short term interest rates have caused long-term
rates to respond similarly. This response is consistent with economic theory
and agrees with Model B. However, until very recently the yield curve has been
acting uncharacteristically. Figure 3 illustrates that the FOMC has increased the
federal funds rate for the past ten sessions. This increase in short term rates has
not caused all interest rates to respond upwardly. Long-term rates have fallen
and the yield curve has continued to flatten.
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According to Haubrich and Dombrosky (1995) the slope of the yield
curve shares a relationship with the business cycle. Historically, higher longterm interest rates correspond with high growth expectations. Currently, the
U.S. economy is recovering from a recession and economic growth indicators
look promising. Under the present circumstances the spread between short
and long-term rates should be widening, but this is not the case. Figure 4 is a
scatterplot graph of the ten-year three month interest rate spread and expected
GDP in one year. According to this graph, Haubrich and Dombrosky’s argument
appears to be true. There is a positive relationship between these two variables,
yet long-term interest rates are falling while the economic recovery is promising.
In addition, the current account deficit in the United States has grown,
and almost every economist would agree that there will be some correction in
the future. The U.S. current account as a percent of GDP can be seen in Figure 5.
This graph illustrates the extensive decline in the current account balance over
the past two and a half decades. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis stated
that the current account balance stood at negative $225 billion in October of
2005. For an adjustment to occur, domestic goods must look more appealing to
foreign consumers. The primary way in which this can take place is if the dollar
depreciates and U.S. goods become comparably less expensive. According to the
interest rate parity theory the difference in interest rates between two countries
is equal to the differential between forward exchange rates and the spot exchange
rate. Therefore, if a foreign investor was to convert his or her money into U.S.
dollars and invest in Treasuries, he would have to take into consideration that
his American currency will likely be worth less in the future. This loss in value
can be compensated with higher interest rates, but investors seem to be settling
for lower yields despite the likelihood of depreciation.
Each of these economic conditions should be placing upward pressure
on long-term interest rates, but recently they have continued to fall. Alan Greenspan, the former chairmen of the Federal Reserve dubbed this current situation
a “conundrum” during his semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress
in February 2006. There are several possibilities that could be counteracting the
downward pressures, but no one is exactly sure which prospect is the cause for
lower long-term bond yields.
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Possible Reasons for Lower Yields
Figure 1 shows that long-term interest rates have remained steady,
short-term interest rates have risen, and consequently the yield curve has recently flattened. According to the loanable funds theory, the liquidity premium
theory and the market segmentation theory, the supply, demand or liquidity risk
for these fixed income securities must have been altered. This behavior may be
related to several macroeconomic influences that have been putting downward
pressure on long-term yields.
One possible explanation, proposed by Mr. Bernanke, is that foreign
central banks have created a savings glut, by saving large quantities in government bonds (Bernanke 2006). Some foreign countries have established fixed
exchange rates with the US dollar and depend on buying U.S. fixed income
securities to maintain their desired exchange rate. Others are simply attracted
to U.S. Treasuries because they are considered a safe haven, considering the
economic and political stability that the United States has demonstrated in
the past, and the reality that United States has never defaulted on its Treasury
debts. Such credibility makes this market very appealing to foreign countries
looking to invest in both short and long-term securities. According to Bernanke
national savings is high in foreign countries, and their central banks have been
increasing the demand for government bonds. This increases the demand for
Treasuries, prices rise and yields fall (there is an inverse relationship between
price and yields). It is clear according to Figure 6 that there has been a substantial
increase in foreign demand for treasuries since 2001. Furthermore, according
to the Federal Reserve of San Francisco, in 2004 foreign countries purchased
$235 billion dollars worth of U.S. Treasuries. Therefore, one possibility is that
foreign central banks have created a savings glut, causing an extensive increase
in demand for U.S. securities.
Another possible cause for lower long-term rates may be a reduction
in investors’ inflation expectations. Inflation erodes the purchasing power of
money. Therefore, a lender typically expects to be compensated for this loss in
purchasing power by receiving higher interest on loans. This concept holds true
with the bond market. If investors believe inflation will remain low throughout
the life of their investment, then they will be willing to invest in the lower yields,
because their real return will remain relatively high. Since the late 1980s, the
Federal Reserve has kept inflation under control and has been able to maintain
stable low inflation rates. Figure 7 is a visual representation of ten-year-out infla76

tionary expectations that was survey data taken from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters on the Philadelphia Fed website. According to this graph, expected
inflation has been declining since the early 1980s, and is at its lowest level in
recent history. However, from 2000 to 2006 inflation expectations have remained
low and stable. Therefore, we can continue to look for alternative explanations
for the conundrum.
Greenspan believes that the risk associated with long-term investments
has subsided, because the Federal Reserve has successfully controlled inflation
in recent years. This explanation implies a reduction in the risk premium, and
investors are settling for lower yields because of the reduced risk. Regardless,
nobody is exactly sure why interest rates are behaving the way that they are.
Interest rate risk is the primary threat associated with U.S. Treasuries.
As interest rates fluctuate, bonds held by investors become worth more or less.
The longer the term to maturity, the greater the possibility that interest rate
volatility will affect the value of the security. This risk is also incorporated in the
liquidity premium. Therefore, one possible cause for lower long-term interest
rates may be directly related to a reduction in this interest rate risk premium.
As I have mentioned, long-term interest rates are dependent on two variables:
expected futures short term rates, and an additional risk premium. A reduction in interest rate risk may be responsible for a reduction concerning interest
rate premiums. In this model we calculate a risk premium by using a 36 month
rolling standard deviation in the ten-year yield. Figure 8 visually shows how the
volatility in the ten-year yield has declined since the mid 1980s.
Ben Bernanke has referenced the possibility of lower risk premiums.
Before the 1980s, economic trends were much more volatile. Since the 1980s the
United States government has learned how to limit its GDP growth and inflation
volatility. Economists call this phenomenon the “Great Moderation.” This trend
can be seen in Figure 8. U.S. interest rate volatility has been on a downward trend
since the early 1980s and is at its lowest level in decades. This change has created
a more predictable economy and increased invertors’ confidence. It is possible
that this change is directly responsible for lower long-term yields, because if
investors expect this trend to continue they should be willing to accept lower
liquidity (risk) premiums.
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Data and Results
Model of Ten-Year Treasury Yield
The model in this paper builds on the basic methods presented in the
Warnock and Warnock paper “International Capital Flows and U.S. Interest
Rates.” This paper concentrates on the ten-year Treasury yield as the dependent
variable, and several independent macroeconomic variables that theory suggests
affect this interest rate. These variables were chosen because they provide an
explanation for long-term interest rates, based on macroeconomic conditions,
policy, and future expectations. Some of the variables proxy for expectations
and derive from survey data, since bond yields are greatly influenced by future
expectations.1 However, robustness checks reconfirm my initial results when
the survey data is removed from the model. Like the Warnock paper, I found
that my model is very good at explaining the ten-year yield level, and in the most
recent years long-term rates are only slightly lower than would be expected.
Theory suggests that the ten-year-ahead inflation expectation variable has a positive relationship to the ten-year interest rate. When investors
believe inflation will be high they require a higher yield to compensate for the
loss in the purchasing power of money. In other words, nominal interest rates
must increase to ensure desired real interest rates. In addition, an expected
GDP variable is also added to the model, because this feature is likely to affect
government, and monetary policy, given that expected GDP is typically a signal
for future inflation (Warnock 2005). Inflation tends to appear when there are
high levels of economic growth. To combat high levels of inflation the Federal
Reserve will increase the federal funds rate. Higher interest rates encourage more
investing, slow economic growth, and lower inflation by siphoning money out
of the economy. Therefore, an expected GDP variable is used to proxy for these
policy decisions. Additionally, using net foreign purchases of U.S. treasuries as
a percent of GDP, I account for foreign countries influence on the U.S. Treasury
market. The model shows that an increase in foreign investment in the Treasury
market does lead to an increase in the demand for bonds, causing prices to rise,
and interest rates to fall. The current account data could not be used in this
regression, because the data are not exogenous.
Monetary policy and fiscal policy are also a determinant of long-term
interest rates. As expected, the model shows that the federal funds rate also
1

Additional information concerning the data used in this paper is located in the data appendix
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positively affects these yields. According to the liquidity premium equation,
expressed in Model B, long-term interest rates are dependent on expected short
term rates. Therefore, when the Federal Reserve increases short-term interest
rates, long-term rates will be affected according to investors’ future short term
rate expectations. Moreover, the U.S. deficit as a percent of GDP was chosen,
because as federal debt increases more Treasuries are issued to pay for the debt.
Therefore, the deficit causes the supply of bonds to increase, prices to fall and
yields to rise
Furthermore, the risk premium variable is anticipated to have a direct
positive relationship to long-term interest rates. If investors consider long-term
investments to be less risky, they will require a lower premium. Warnock and
Warnock mention that U.S. government bonds are considered to have no default risk, because the government has never defaulted on a Treasury payment.
However, investors are subject to interest rate risk. To proxy for this, a variable
was generated by calculated a 36 month rolling standard deviation of the tenyear interest rate.
With these variables I use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression,
and out-of-sample forecasting to evaluate recent long-term interest rate trends.
This regression holds the ten-year interest rate as the dependent variable. The
e
regressors used include: ten-year-ahead inflation expectations ( gt +1 ); the federal
funds rate ( ff t ); an interest rate risk premium ( ff t ); expected GDP growth over
the next year ( gte+1 ); the budget deficit; and foreign purchases of U.S. bonds.2
it ,10 = c + a(p te+10 ) + b( ff t ) + c(rpt ) + d (gte+1 ) + e(deficit t −1 ) + f ( foreignt ) + e t

Econometric Issues
There are three econometric issues that must be addressed. The first
deals with the simultaneity of the variables. I will presuppose that the variables
on the right-hand side of the expression do not respond to the ten-year level. This
is a sensible assumption, because the work of Diebold, Rudebush and Aruoba
(2004) establishes that interest rates have little influence on macro conditions,
while macroeconomic changes do affect yields. In addition, Warnock and Warnock mention that this tactic is reasonable, and it is a generally accepted practice.
Some variables are more credible than others. For example, it is possible that
the federal funds rate and the survey data are likely influenced by the interest
rate levels, but this assumption is still held.
2

Additional information concerning these variables can be located in the data appendix.
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The remaining issues that need to be addressed deal with autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The potential problem with autocorrelation
comes from the cyclical nature of several of the macroeconomic regressors.
For example, it is likely that expected GDP will trend up for a time period, and
then tend back down for a phase, and this pattern will continue. According to
Schmidt (2005), these macroeconomic shocks suggest that the error terms will
not be independent of each other. This is an econometric problem, because
this violates the Gauss-Markov theorem that variations are not correlated with
other disturbances. I account for this problem by using a correlation variable
[AR(1)] that considers the residual from the past observation in the regression
model for the current observation.3 The software package that I use is capable
of transforming the regression results by adjusting the sample to account for
the lagged data used in the estimation, and reports the adjusted sample along
with the remainder of the estimation output. For example, in Table 1 the AR(1)
variable has a coefficient of 0.79. This means that when there is a positive error, and one of the explanatory variables is one percent higher than we would
expect, the following quarter it will till be 0.79 percent higher than we would
have expected. In the next quarter, the effect is (0.79) squared or 0.62. When
this coefficient is incorporated the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.74. This value
falls inside of the upper and lower critical levels of 1.518 and 1.801, for a regression with 88 observations and seven independent variables. Therefore, I do not
reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, and I use the OLS estimates of
the parameters.
The final issue concerns heteroskedasticity, or the possibility that regressors have different variances throughout the sample period. According to
Schmidt (2005), alteration in the error terms may cause the parameters to be
more or less accurate, because the Gauss-Markov theorem also states that each
error term must continually have the same variance, or standard deviation. To
test for this, I performed a White heteroskedasticity test which can be seen in
Table 1. This test reported an R-squared statistic of 30.52 and a probability of
0.29. Therefore, according to these results the model does not suffer from a
heteroskedasticity problem.
After running the regression, the results show that all of these variables
are statistically significant, with inflation expectations and the federal funds
3

The program used was EViews 4.1. More information on the AR(1) variable can be located in the Student help section under 		
serial correlation theory.
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rate significant at the one percent level. Furthermore, the risk premium and
expected GDP fall into the five percent range, while the budget deficit and foreign purchases are significant at the ten percent level. Table 1 illustrates that a
one percent increase in ten-year-ahead inflation expectations leads to a 69 basis
point (0.69%) increase in the ten-year yield. If the Federal Reserve increases the
federal funds rate by one percent, it causes a 17 basis point increase in the tenyear interest rate. The same logic is held for the remaining variables, where all
coefficients are intuitively correct, and each abides by the macroeconomic theory
discussed earlier in this paper. For example, if the risk premium increases by one
percentage point, the interest rate will jump 20 basis points. In addition, when
one-year-ahead GDP expectations increases by one point, long-term interest
rates will fall by 30 basis points. The ten-year Treasury yield is also expected
to decline by 18 basis points when the deficit increases by one percent. Finally,
when foreign purchases of U.S. Treasuries increases by one percent, long-term
interest rates will decline by 57 basis points.
Forecast
Figure 9 illustrates the actual long-term Treasury yield compared to a
fitted model produced by dynamic out-of-sample forecasting. The dotted line
is the actual ten-year bond rate, and the solid line is the expected interest rates
from the first quarter of 2002 to the first quarter in 2006. The graph shows that
during recent years actual long-term interest rates have been lower than the
model would have anticipated. At the beginning of 2003, the spread between
the ten-year rate and the forecasted level was greater than one hundred basis
points. This is partially due to a period of declining foreign purchases and a
reduction in the budget deficit from 2002:2 to 2003:1. This spread narrows in
2004:1 because of large increases in foreign flows and the budget deficit. In the
third quarter of 2005, long-term interest rates and the model’s predicted level
nearly converged. However, a significant drop in net foreign purchase of longterm U.S. treasuries from 2005:4 to 2006:1, and the Federal Reserve’s increase
in the federal funds rate caused the forecasted level to spike. At the same time,
the ten-year interest rate dropped slightly, causing a 70 basis point spread at
the start of 2006. Therefore, according to this forecast long-term interest rates
should have been slightly higher in recent years and at the start of 2006.
Using this single equation model, I also find the relative importance of
each variable during my forecast period. I did this by calculating each variable’s
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sample average from 1990:1 to 2002:1, and each average from 2002:2 to 2006:1.
According to this model, the difference between these two numbers, multiplied
by the corresponding coefficients of each variable provided by the OLS regression results, is the average effect that each variable has on the level of long term
interest rates during the 2002:1 to 2006:1 time period in relation to the 1990:1
to 2002:1 sample.
Table 3 provides the results from this exercise. This table shows that
the average level of long term interest rates is 216 basis points lower in 2002:1
to 2006:1 than they were during the 1990:1 to 2002:1 sample. Furthermore, this
model suggests that inflation expectations has the greatest influence and should
have caused interest rates to be 59 basis points lower during the more recent time
period. In addition, the federal funds rate should have caused long-term rates
to go down by 55 basis points. The model also suggests that the risk premium,
expected GDP, and foreign flows variables have the same downward pressure
with 37, 30, and 26 basis points respectively. The budget data variable was the
only exception causing interest rates to rise by 29 basis points. Finally, this table
also shows that only 38 basis points are not explained by the model.
Vector Autoregression (VAR)
There is a noteworthy weakness concerning the OLS regression that the
Warnock and Warnock paper does not fully address. In this model there are possible dynamic interactions between the variables. According to Schmidt (2005),
vector autoregressions (VAR) are commonly used to forecast macroeconomic
data when the performance of the variables over time is important. A VAR is
especially useful when an individual desires to create a model that accounts for
the progress of interrelated variables over time. VARs consider the likelihood
that a change in one variable at time t will likely affect each of the other variables
at time t + 1. Furthermore, the change at time t, and the adjustment at time t + 1
causes an additional change at time t + 2.
I estimated a VAR including the budget deficit, an interest rate risk
e
premium ( ff t ), ten-year-ahead inflation expectations ( gt +1 ); the federal funds
e
rate ( ff t ), expected GDP growth over the next year ( gt + 1 ), foreign purchases
of U.S. bonds, and the ten-year interest rate ( it ,10 ). Four lags for each variable
were used and the sample period ranged from 1981:1 to 2002:2. The impulse
response functions shown in Figure 10 illustrate how the ten-year bond rate
responds to a one standard deviation shock in each of the other variables. The
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Cholesky decomposition was used to orthogonalize the residuals under the assumption that the ten-year bond rate responds contemporaneously to all of the
other variables. The ordering of the variables used to create this response is the
same as the order as they were mentioned, and the same order as they appear
in Figure 10.
Figure 10 illustrates the ten-year Treasury yield’s response to a one
standard deviation shock in each of the explanatory variables. For example, the
first graph on the left-hand side of Figure 10 shows that a one standard deviation shock in the Treasury yield will lead to an immediate, positive, statistically
significant increase. This shock will have its greatest effect initially, approximately
45 basis points, and will eventually correct itself over time. The graph directly
below shows the effect of a one standard deviation shock to inflation expectations
(1.29%) on long-term interest rates. As the chart shows, an increase in inflation
expectations today will have the greatest affect approximately eight periods (2
years) later, where it peaks at approximately 28 basis points. This response is also
intuitively correct, according to economic theory higher inflationary expectations lead to higher long-term yields.
The chart at the bottom of Figure 10 also coincides with economic
theory. This graph visually shows the negative response in the ten-year treasury
yield when there is a one standard deviation increase in the foreign purchases
of U.S. Treasuries (0.24% of GDP). The ten-year bond rate initially decreases
by roughly 10 basis points and continues to fall throughout all five years. This
response agrees with economic theory that an increase in the demand for these
securities causes prices to rise and yields to fall. At the same time, the chart at
the top and middle of Figure 10 shows how a one standard deviation increase in
the budget surplus (reduction in the deficit) affects the interest rate. This graph
is relatively inconsequential with a small initial decrease in the interest rate, followed by a short spike one year later, and a steady move towards is original level.
It is not statistically significant, but the initial reaction agrees with economic
theory. If the government has a smaller deficit then there is less need to issue
Treasuries, causing prices to rise and yields to fall.
The chart in the middle of the second row illustrates that a one standard
deviation increase in the federal funds rate (3.37%) causes the interest rate to
rise by approximately 17 basis points in the first quarter. The rate bumps its way
back to its original level by the start of the sixth quarter. This coincides with
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economic theory, because long-term rates, according to Model B, are dependent
on short term rates.
The graph at the top right-hand side of Figure 10 shows how the ten-year
interest rate responds to a one standard deviation increase in the risk premium
(2.24%). Initially, there is little response, but starting in the second quarter the
rate begins to rise, until it reaches its greatest effect, roughly 33 basis points, in
quarter six. It continues to correct towards it original value, but remains positive throughout the five year span. Again, macroeconomic theory supports this
outcome. Model B shows that interest rates include a term premium which is
total risk associated with the securities. Therefore, as a bond becomes more
risky, yields on that bond rise.
Finally, the chart at the lower right-hand side of Figure 10 demonstrates
how the ten-year bond responds to a one standard deviation increase in one year
out expected GDP (0.67%). This increase originally causes the interest rate to fall
slightly. However, the bond rate then continues to rise and reaches its peak of 15
basis points in quarter three. The rate reaches it originally level by quarter four
and continues it downward trend until it arrives at its lowest level of negative
ten basis points in quarter seven. Following quarter seven, the ten-year bond
rate moves back to its original level, and reaches this level around quarter ten.
The initial increase in yields agrees with macroeconomic theory. Often, as GDP
increases, inflation coincides with this increase. Therefore, if investors see higher
GDP growth as an indication of inflation they will demand higher yields.
VAR Forecast
Figure 11 illustrates a dynamic out-of-sample forecast using this
VAR model, and it compares the forecast to actual historical ten-year yields.
This graph shows that the model is quite good at shadowing the ten-year yield.
However, it is also clear that from 2002:2 to 2006:1, the forecasted model would
have expected long-term interest rates to be higher than they have been. Figure
11 shows, according to this VAR model, that the ten-year Treasury yield should
have been approximately 20 to 60 basis points higher from 2002:2 to 2006:1. In
2006:1 the ten-year interest rate was approximately 30 basis points lower than
the model would have predicted.
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Robustness Checks
I believe that my original model explains long-term interest rates very
well, but in this section I will examine some variations of the model. First, I
eliminated the survey data of expected one-year GDP growth and ten-year inflation expectations, and replaced it with the previous quarter’s percent change
in GDP and the percent change in the consumer price index (CPI) respectively.
All other aspects concerning this model are held constant. The elimination of
the survey data makes this model more like standard forecasting exercises. The
results from the OLS regression can be seen in Table 2. This table shows that
the change in CPI and the federal funds rate variables are both significant at
the one percent level. In addition, the percent change in GDP variable, which is
significant at the five percent level, is the only other variable that remains statistically significant. The results from this regression also show that when one of
these statistically significant variables increase by one percent, the CPI variable
will cause the ten-year to rise 28 basis points, the change in GDP variable will
cause the ten-year to fall 12 basis points, and the federal funds rate will lead to
a 13 basis point increase. Each of these results correspond with the economic
theory discussed earlier in the paper.
Figure 12 shows the new the out-of-sample forecast for 2002:1 to 2006:1.
Once again, it is clear that long-term interest rates are lower than the model
would have suggested for this sample period. In fact, this version of the model is
more dramatic than the original. It shows that in 2006:1 the model would have
placed ten-year interest rates over 200 basis points higher.
I also used dummy variables to see if there was a shift in the ten-year
interest rate during my sample period. The dummy variables showed that there
was not a shift in the curve in 2001:1, 2002:1, or 2003:1. The dummy variable
was statistically insignificant in each of these checks, and the other regressors
remained significant at the ten percent, five prevent or one percent levels.
I do additional robustness checks by altering both the order of the
variables and the number of lags in the VAR estimates. First, I used the same
ordering as the original VAR estimate, but I changed the number of lags from
four, to six and eight. The impulse response to these VARs can be seen in figures
13 and 14 respectively. These charts illustrate that the robustness checks tend
to correspond with the original model. Furthermore, each of the charts has a
tendency to agree with the economic theory previously discussed. In addition,
impulse response charts can be seen for a VAR with the original variables, but
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arranged in the reverse Cholesky order. The only exception is that the ten year
variable remains last in the ordering. These graphs illustrate that the order of
the variables is relatively insignificant, because each variable responds similarly
despite the change.
Conclusion
According to Model B, there are two possible reasons for lower interest-rates.
Yields will fall if the demand for these securities increases, or the risk associated
with the bonds declines. Mr.Greenspan and Mr. Bernanke have each provided different solutions. Mr. Greenspan tends to believe that there has been a reduction
in the risk premium. According to him, the Fed’s ability to control inflation and
the “Great Moderation” have led to lower volatility and reduced risk associated
with longer maturities. This implies investors are accepting uncharacteristically
low historical yields, because there is less risk. Table 3 supports this concept. The
table shows that the risk premium variable used in the OLS regression should
have caused the ten-year rate to decline by 37 basis points. On the other hand,
Mr. Bernanke, and the Warnock paper, tends to believe that there has been a significant increase in foreign demand for U.S. Treasuries. According to Bernanke,
this increase in demand has caused prices to rise and yields to fall substantially.
Once again, this is another possible reason for recent low long-term interest
rates. According to the results in Table 3, foreign demand for U.S. Treasuries
has caused interest rates to decline by 26 basis points.
I generate a model similar to the one produced by Warnock and Warnock, and this regression is used to evaluate the recent phenomena concerning
long-term interest rates. Economic theories provide support for the selection of
the variables used in the model, and these theories explain each of the variables’
effects on the ten-year Treasury rate. The results from the OLS regression confirm previous findings, with all of the variables being statistically significant, and
all influencing interest rates in accordance with economic theory. Out-of-sample
forecasting shows that from 2002:2 to 2006:1 long-term interest rates have been
slightly lower than the model would have predicted them to be. However, the
OLS model accounts for approximately 80 percent of the downward pressure
on long-term interest rates.
This paper builds on earlier work, and I use a VAR analysis to reconfirm that long-term interest rates respond to macroeconomic shocks, and the
responses are consistent with economic theory. Figure 11 shows that from 2002:1
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to 2006:1 the ten-year Treasury yield has been consistently lower than the model
would have anticipated, and in 2006:1 interest rates remain roughly 30 basis
points lower than the forecasted level. Using the results from the VAR and the
OLS regressions presented in this paper we can conclude that long-term interest
rates are in fact low, but not unexpectedly low. My model is able to account for
approximately eighty percent of the downward pressure on long-term interest
rates during the 2002 to 2006 sample period. Therefore, according to this model
the U.S. Treasury market conundrum only consists of 30 to 38 basis points.
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Tables
Table 1:

4

***Significant at the 99% level
**Significant at the 95% level
*Significant at the 90% level
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Table 2:

5

***Significant at the 99% level
**Significant at the 95% level
*Significant at the 90% level
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Table 3:

Graphs
Figure 1: Ten year Treasury and federal funds rate 2001:1 to 2006:1.

*For all figures refer to the data appendix for further information and the source of the data.
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Figure 2: U.S. Federal Budget Deficit/Surplus as a percent of GDP.

U.S. Budget Deficit
Figure 3: Effective federal funds rate as a percent.
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Ten Year Three Month Treasury Spread

Figure 4: Scatterplot graph with expected GDP and the ten-year to three
month interest rate spread.

Expected GDP

Figure 5: Graph of the U.S. current account as a percent of GDP.
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Figure 6: Net Foreign Purchases of U.S. Treasuries as a Percent of GDP.

Figure 7: Survey data for ten-year-out inflation expectations.
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Figure 8: Risk premium was calculated by creating a 36 month rolling standard deviation for the ten-year yield.

Figure 9: Actual ten-year Treasury yield compared to the fitted model produced by dynamic forecasting for 2002:1 to 2006:1.
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Figure 10: The ten-year interest rate response, over time, to a one percent
increase in one of the alternative variables with four lags.
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Figure 11: VAR forecast compared to actual ten-year yields from 2002:1 to
2006:1.

Figure 12: Robust out-of-sample forecast.
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Figure 13: The ten-year interest rate response, over time, to a one percent
increase in one of the alternative variables with six lags.
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Figure 14: The ten-year interest rate response, over time, to a one percent
increase in one of the alternative variables with eight lags.
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Figure 15: The ten-year interest rate response, over time, to a one percent increase in one of the alternative variables, with four lags, the reverse Cholesky
order but ten year is still last in the order.
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Expected GDP One-Year-Out, 1968:1-2005:2 with 5 missing variables, last three observations are
the same as 2005:2 (the log of expected United States GDP divided by base year), Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis
Expected Inflation Ten-Years-Out, 1980:1-2005:2 Survey of Professional Forecasters, (United
States), Philadelphia Fed Website
Federal Funds Rate, 1960:1-2005:2 last three observations are the same as 2005:2, (United States),
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Net Foreign Purchases of Treasuries, 1977:1-2006:1, www.treas.gov/tic
Percent change in the consumer price index, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers,
1960:1 to 2006:1, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Percent change in GDP, Seasonally adjusted real GDP; 1960:2006:1, (United States), Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Risk premium was calculated by creating a 36 month rolling standard deviation for the ten-year
bond rates, 1960:1-2006:1
Ten-Year Interest Rate, Constant Maturity Rate as a percent, 1960:1-2006:1 first month in each
quarter, (United States), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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Have CAFE Standards Reduced the Effect
of Gasoline Prices on Domestic Automobile
Manufacturers’ Market Share
of the US Market?
Abdelwahed Tazi
INTRODUCTION
One of macroeconomists’ major concerns is GDP volatility, and understanding what causes this volatility is essential when attempting to reduce it.
For decades, the automotive industry has been a major component of US GDP.
Therefore, understanding the driving forces behind this industry indirectly contributes to the study of GDP volatility. This paper focuses on CAFE standards
and how they change the effect of oil prices on US automobile sales.
What motivates this paper is the fact that during the mid-to-late 80s,
fluctuations in the market share of domestic automobile manufacturers diminished substantially. Figure 1 presents the sales of domestic automakers’ automobiles as a fraction of the domestic market (market share) from January 1974
to June 2004. One can easily notice that around month 170, which corresponds
to February 1988, there is a dramatic decrease in volatility. What could be the
cause in the decrease of this volatility?
One of the major differences between American and foreign automobiles
has been their fuel efficiencies. In their hedonic technique for estimating the
demand for automobile fuel efficiency, Atkinson and Halvorsen conclude that
an increase in the price of gasoline results in an increased demand for “foreign,
more fuel efficient, automobiles”. This finding is not surprising because gasoline
is a complement for automobiles. This paper focuses on Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE), a policy that increases fuel efficiency, to explain the reduction
in the volatility of domestic automobile manufacturers’ national market share.
CAFE REGULATIONS
CAFE standards were enacted in 1975 in response to the 1973-1974
Arab oil embargoes. CAFE is the sales weighted average fuel economy, expressed
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in miles per gallon, of a manufacturer’s fleet of passenger cars manufactured for
sale in the United States. Fuel economy is defined as the average mileage traveled
by an automobile per gallon of gasoline. The mileage standard increased to 27.5
mpg in 1985, and it currently remains at that level.
Congress specified that CAFE standards must be set at the “maximum
feasible level”. This means that factors such as technological feasibility and economic practicability must be taken into consideration before setting a standard.
Thus, the burden of CAFE standards should be reasonable.
Manufacturers’ domestic and import fleets must separately meet the
27.5 mpg CAFE standard so as not to be subjected to any penalties. Penalties
include a civil fine of $55 per car/mpg. For example, if a manufacturer produces
one million cars with a sales-weighted mpg of 26.5 mpg, that firm would be subject to a fine of $55 per car/mpg * 1 million cars * 1 mpg, or $55 million. Some
foreign automakers view this fine as a tax, and manufacturers such as BMW and
Mercedes-Benz have routinely paid CAFE fines (Kleit 1981). However, American firms view these standards as binding because their lawyers have advised
them that if they violate the standards, they would be liable for civil damages
in stockholders’ suits. Thus, domestic manufacturers have never paid a civil
penalty. Asian manufacturers have never paid civil penalties either. The next
section provides an important event in the domestic automobile industry.

A BRIEF HISTORY
In 1981, the US was suffering the effects of the second OPEC oil price
shock. Faced with higher gasoline prices, consumers began to shift their demand
from low fuel efficiency US autos to higher fuel efficiency Japanese autos. In
fact, Chrysler Corporation would have gone bankrupt if it weren’t for the US
government’s subsidized loans. After several discussions with the US trade
representatives, the Japanese eventually agreed to a Voluntary Export Restraint
policy on auto exports, which lasted until the early 90s. The result of VERs was
to increase the price for the importing countries because of a reduction in supply. Portney et al. (2003) found that tighter CAFE standards raised the price of
new vehicles, so one would think VERs slightly offset the price effect of tighter
CAFE standards by making Japanese automobiles slightly less attractive. However, many Japanese manufacturers shipped unassembled autos to Taiwan and
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South Korea, where they were assembled and exported to the US. Furthermore,
manufacturers such as Honda, Mazda, Toyota, Mitsubishi, and Nissan opened
assembly plants in the US and were not included in the export restriction.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Extensive work on CAFE standards and their impact on general welfare has
been done, and although many economists have found the standards to save some
gasoline, the welfare losses associated with CAFE standards are too large. Kleit (2004)
found that a long run 3.0 MPG increase in the CAFE standard would impose an
estimated welfare loss of about $4 billion per year and save about 5.2 billion gallons
of gasoline per year. He also suggests that an 11 cent-per-gallon tax would generate
the same amount of fuel saving while only costing $290 million per year. Portney
et al. (2003) also found that tighter standards would save gasoline, but they would
also increase the price of new vehicles, worsen traffic congestion and--depending
on how they are phased in--possibly even reduce occupant safety.
To my knowledge, no economist has examined the effect of CAFE standards on the volatility of the automotive domestic market share. Kleit (2002),
among others, goes so far as to find that the standards shift revenue away from
U.S. automakers to foreign firms. However, it is reasonable to believe that CAFE
standards make domestic vehicles on par with foreign vehicles in terms of fuel
efficiency. Also, it should come at no surprise that fluctuations in oil prices have
been found to have a significant effect on the sales of automobiles: Atkinson and
Halvorsen (1984) conclude that an increase in the price of gasoline results in an
increased demand for fuel efficiency. Although Duncan (1980) did not find the
price of gasoline to have a significant effect on the aggregate demand, he found
it affected the relative ratios of different vehicles significantly. One explanation
behind this is that some people cannot be without cars because of impractical
alternatives (non-hassle free public transportation), so they decide to purchase
more fuel-efficient vehicles instead.
MODEL
In modeling the effects of CAFE standards, this paper uses the domestic market share of domestic automakers (auto market share). This variable
has many advantages over using gross sales. For example, when dealing with
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market share, we can concentrate on factors that lead to an increase or decrease
in foreign automobile sales in domestic markets without having to worry about
consumers switching to other forms of transportation such as light trucks or
public transportation. Therefore, analyzing changes in market distribution can
help shed light on how CAFE standards have changed the competitiveness of
domestic automobiles in comparison with foreign automobiles.
The rest of the model is based on affordability; given certain assumptions, whether a consumer will purchase a domestic automobile or a foreign
automobile will depend on several factors that contribute to affordability. Before
purchasing a vehicle, a consumer will consider interest rates, which dictate his
cost of borrowing to purchase the car. Given a consumer who needs to purchase
a new car, the higher the interest rate, the more likely his/her choice will be affected by the car’s price because of differences in interest payments. Although
one argument against using this variable is that the lending rate is the same
whether one buys foreign or domestic automobiles, it is included in the model
because Portney et al (2003) found that tighter CAFE standards increase the
price of new cars. If the standards raise the prices of domestic automobiles, then
this variable is relevant. Another important factor is the exchange rate, which
affects the prices of foreign automobiles, making them more or less competitive. Thus, a high exchange rate (price of domestic currency in this case) should
have a negative impact on the domestic share of the domestic market. A third
factor that would matter is disposable income. As disposable income increases,
one would expect consumers to purchase an automobile without as much price
consideration. Thus, the model uses this idea to try and correct for any price
effect that would otherwise not be visible. Finally, oil prices, which are determined in part by the state of the US economy, because the US consumes about
25% of the world’s oil production, matter when buying a domestic or foreign
automobile because of historical differences in fuel efficiencies. This variable is
very important because as CAFE standards become tighter, we would expect
fuel efficiencies to converge, making this variable less significant. Finally, given
the US government’s pro free trade characteristics, tariffs are not assigned a role
in this model.
Some reasonable assumptions are made in this model. The first assumption is that technology is homogenous. This means that domestic automakers can
borrow foreign automakers’ technology and produce everything they produce.
Of course, there are some adjustment costs for domestic manufacturers. The
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second assumption dictates that ceteris paribus, American consumers prefer
domestic automobiles. This is a reasonable assumption if one considers sentiments of nationalism, or knowledge of how economy works, coupled with the
desire to see it grow. Another argument for the latter assumption would be
employee discounts and bonuses, which without loss of generality can also be
considered a preference for domestic vehicles.
DATA
All the data are monthly and range from January 1974 to June 2004.
Unadjusted monthly data on motor vehicles unit sales were obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The variable auto market share is created and
represents domestic automobile sales as a fraction of domestic plus foreign
automobile sales. The prime rate, in percent, was obtained from the Saint Louis
Federal Reserve’s database as a measurement of the interest rate. The exchange
rate is composed of a weighted average of the major currencies that were traded
against the US dollar and was obtained from the same database as the prime rate.
Disposable income is in real terms, and oil prices denote the price per barrel
that refineries pay to acquire their oil.
There is extensive literature about testing and correcting for unit roots
when working with time series data. To be safe, the Dickey-Fuller test was used
to test whether the null, which assumes a unit root, could be rejected at the
5% level. When it could be rejected, the variable was left unchanged. However,
when there was not enough evidence to reject the unit root, the first difference
of the variable was taken and the whole process repeated. Table 1 displays the
results for the Dickey Fuller tests.
Table 1
variable

undifferenced		
test statistic
p-value

differenced
test statistic

p-value

oil prices
exchange rate
prime rate
disposable income
auto_market_share

-1.095
-1.167
-1.273
3.724		
-3.917

-12.528		
-13.675		
-10.777		
-22.819		
-3.917		

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0019

0.7175
0.6873
0.6405
1
0.0019
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Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the final variables throughout
the entire time period. The number of observations sheds light on whether the
variable was differenced or not.
Table 2
Variable

Obs Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

auto_market_share
exchange_rate
prime_rate
disposable_income
oil

366
365
365
365
365

0.0504563
1.718167
0.5629499
0.0077151
2.056409

0.6594085
-6.898399
-3.94
-0.0393429
-12.01

0.8789939
5.458206
4.290001
0.0573816
11.27

0.7709162
-0.0502025
-0.0156712
0.0024172
-0.0153425

METHODOLOGY
“VAR [vector autoregression] methodology superficially resembles
simultaneous-equation modeling in that we consider several endogenous
variables together (Gujarati).” An advantage of VARs is that each endogenous
variable is explained by the lags of all the other endogenous variables, and there
are usually no exogenous variables. VAR models also make use of the Cholesky
decomposition to provide impulse response functions. When graphed, these
response functions show dynamic responses of certain variables to shocks in
other variables. The model to be estimated is:

Wt = a 0 + A( L)Wt −1 + u t
where W is the vector composed of changes in oil prices (O), changes in the
exchange rates (ε), changes in the prime rate (i), changes in disposable income
(d), and the domestic auto market share (m). (L) is the lag operator that begins
with the identity matrix. Thus, the Cholesky ordering is as follows:

Ot 
Ot −1 
Ot −3 
Ot −12 
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e 
e 
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 t −3 
 t −12 
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Wt = it  = [A1 ]it −1  + [A3 ]it −3  + ... + [A12 ]it −12 
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where

1 a 12
0 1

and where u t = 0
0
0 0

0 0

;

a 13 a 14 a 15  Ot 
 
a 23 a 24 a 25  e t 
1 a 34 a 35  it 
0
1 a 45  d t 

0
0 1  mt 

The VAR model assumes certain variables are only explained contemporaneously by some of the other variables. Oil is contemporaneously determined
by everything else, whereas exchange rates are contemporaneously affected by
all the variables except oil. Changes in the prime rate are contemporaneously
affected by changes in disposable income and the auto market share, whereas
changes in disposable income are only contemporaneously affected by auto
market share. This model assumes all variables can be explained by the lags of
all the other variables in the model.
A difficult component in estimating VAR models is choosing the number
of lags. There exists, as one might expect, a tradeoff between choosing too many
or too few lags (degrees of freedom). One way to determine the number of lags
to be used is the Akaike criterion. This consists of running the VAR estimation
several times using a different number of lags and choosing the number of lags
that yields the most negative value for the Akaike estimation. Another method
involves calculating autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations to help one
decide the lags to be included based on their significance. In this paper, I take
both methods into consideration while choosing the lags that I believe to be
important. This is done because econometricians claim that theory must come
before numbers. The lags chosen are 1, 3, 6, and 12. Notice that this choice
reflects what happened in the previous month, which shows the most recent
conditions, what happened in the end of the previous quarter, which in certain
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months is important for some firms, and what happened six months ago as well
as last year, which were chosen because of common practice in time series.
Finally, the data is broken down into two groups: pre and post 1985,
which is the year the CAFE standards reached their highest point. The Cholesky
decomposition was used in obtaining the graphs of impulse response functions;
the responses of US auto market share to shocks in the prices of oil are displayed
in the results section.
RESULTS
As can be seen from figures 2 and 3, there is a stronger response in
auto market share to shocks in oil prices from 1974 to 1984. Furthermore, this
shock is negative and significant, which means that as the price of oil jumped
up before 1985, auto market share decreased. From figure 3, one can notice
that fuel efficiencies have converged as the CAFE standards reached their peak
because oil shocks no longer have a significant effect on auto market share.
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
Many events have occurred in the automotive industry since 1974.
However, the most notable of these changes was the implementation of CAFE
standards. Thanks to these standards, changes in the price of oil have ceased to
significantly affect domestic auto-manufacturers’ share of the domestic market.
Other events, such as the Japanese voluntary export restraints, have also taken
place during this time period, but there is no theoretical evidence supporting
their relevance in the decreased volatility of automobile manufacturer’s domestic
market share. Furthermore, when the VERs are given up, fluctuations in the
market share do not pick up.
An interesting question, which is a hot debate at the moment, is whether
CAFE standards must be increased or not. For now, the results of this paper show
that the standards do not need to be raised because oil prices have little effect on
market share volatility. However, one must consider the fact that technology is
continuously improving, and as foreign vehicles become more efficient, CAFE
standards may need to be raised in order to keep up with the competition.
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